Al-Qaeda

Late 1970s–1980s: Origins in the Afghan-Soviet War

The roots of al Qaeda lie in the Afghan-Soviet War (1979–1989), where the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies supported mujahideen fighters against the Soviet Union. Ghost Wars by Steve Coll (2004) provides a detailed account of this period, noting that the CIA funneled billions of dollars through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to arm and train Afghan and Arab fighters, including those who would later form al Qaeda. Coll explains, “The CIA’s covert role in Afghanistan… helped create the conditions for the rise of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network” (Coll, 2004, p. 66).

The influx of Arab volunteers, inspired by anti-Soviet jihad, included Osama bin Laden, who arrived in Afghanistan in the early 1980s to support the mujahideen. The Politics of Heroin by Alfred W. McCoy (1972, revised 2003) contextualizes this period by highlighting how the CIA’s alliances with drug traffickers in Afghanistan facilitated the heroin trade to fund covert operations. While not directly naming al Qaeda, McCoy notes that “the CIA’s covert operations in Afghanistan transformed the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands into the world’s largest heroin-producing region” (McCoy, 2003, p. 478). This drug trade provided financial networks that later supported militant groups, including those associated with bin Laden.

A Mosque in Munich by Ian Johnson (2010) adds another layer, detailing how the CIA supported the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups in the West to counter Soviet influence. Johnson describes how the CIA’s backing of Islamic networks in Europe, particularly through mosques like the one in Munich, created ideological and logistical hubs that later fed into al Qaeda’s recruitment. He writes, “The CIA’s support for Islamist movements… laid the groundwork for the global jihadist movement” (Johnson, 2010, p. 112).

Late 1980s: Formation of al Qaeda

In 1988, Osama bin Laden (with funding from the CIA) formally established al Qaeda in Peshawar, Pakistan, to continue jihad beyond the Afghan-Soviet War. Ghost Wars recounts this moment, stating, “Bin Laden founded al Qaeda to serve as a base—literally, ‘the base’ in Arabic—for coordinating global jihadist efforts” (Coll, 2004, p. 201). The group aimed to unite Arab fighters from the Afghan war and channel their efforts. . The Terror Timeline by Paul Thompson (2004) corroborates this, noting that al Qaeda’s early infrastructure relied on financial networks established during the Afghan war, including bin Laden’s personal wealth and connections to Saudi donors. Thompson writes, “By 1989, al Qaeda had established training camps and financial channels that would sustain its operations for decades” (Thompson, 2004, p. 45). The CIA tied bank, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, aided with this endeavor.

Early 1990s: Expansion and Early Attacks

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, al Qaeda shifted its focus to new targets, particularly the United States, which bin Laden viewed as an imperialist force supporting corrupt Middle Eastern regimes. Ghost Wars details al Qaeda’s relocation to Sudan in 1991, where bin Laden established training camps and businesses to fund operations. Coll notes, “Sudan provided al Qaeda a safe haven to plan attacks and build its global network” (Coll, 2004, p. 240).

1000 Years for Revenge by Peter Lance (2003) and Triple Cross by Peter Lance (2006) highlight al Qaeda’s early operations in the United States, particularly through Ali Mohamed, a double agent who infiltrated the CIA, Green Berets, and FBI while working for bin Laden. Lance writes, “Ali Mohamed was al Qaeda’s master spy, training operatives in New York and providing intelligence to bin Laden” (Lance, 2003, p. 78). Mohamed’s activities facilitated the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, carried out by al Qaeda-linked operatives like Ramzi Yousef. Triple Cross adds, “The 1993 bombing was al Qaeda’s first major strike on U.S. soil, exposing FBI vulnerabilities” (Lance, 2006, p. 112). Keep in mind that the CIA and NSA were monitoring al Qaeda, the mosques and all communication during this period.

The Forty Years War by Len Colodny (2009) provides geopolitical context, noting that U.S. neoconservative policies in the Middle East, including support for Israel and military presence in Saudi Arabia, was knowingly used by the intelligence serves to serve as a basis to exploit al Qaeda terror. While not directly citing al Qaeda, Colodny argues, “U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s radicalized Islamist movements” (Colodny, 2009, p. 245), aligning with al Qaeda’s growing rhetoric. Peter Tomsen served as U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan with the rank of Ambassador from 1989 to 1992, appointed by President George H.W. Bush. In this role, he had close relationships with Afghan leaders, including President Hamid Karzai and Ahmad Shah Masood, and dealt with senior Taliban, warlords, and religious leaders involved in the region's conflicts. These developments were being tracked by the State Department and coordinated with the CIA.

Gary C Schroen is explicitly identified as having served as CIA Station Chief for both Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s. He is described as one of the agency's foremost experts on the Near East. In the late 1990s, he was involved in the CIA's Mission Center for Counterterrorism and highly involved in attempts to kill or capture Osama bin Laden. The CIA station chief, that worked to create al-Qaeda and bin Laden was in charge of finding and capturing him. He later became Deputy Chief of the CIA's Near East Division in its Directorate of Operations from 1999 to 2001. After 9/11, he famously led the first team of CIA officers to enter Afghanistan.

Meanwhile in next door Pakistan, Milton Bearden: Served as CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986-1989. He was instrumental in the escalation of CIA activities in Afghanistan during the latter part of the Soviet-Afghan War. Robert L. Grenier served as station chief in Islamabad from 1999-2001.

Mid-1990s: Growth and Global Reach

By the mid-1990s, al Qaeda expanded its operations, targeting U.S. interests globally while still receiving support from the CIA. Ghost Wars describes bin Laden’s 1996 return to Afghanistan, where al Qaeda established extensive training camps which mirror the terrorist training camps set up by Otto Skorzeny for Operation Gladio cells in NATO countries. Coll writes, “By 1996, al Qaeda had become a sophisticated terrorist organization with global ambitions” (Coll, 2004, p. 323) just like the Operation Gladio terrorists. That year, bin Laden issued his first public fatwa, declaring war on the United States. While this was going on

Prelude to Terror by Joseph J. Trento (2005) examines the CIA’s failure to prioritize al Qaeda as a threat, despite warnings from analysts. Trento notes, “The CIA underestimated bin Laden’s capabilities, focusing instead on state sponsors like Iran” (Trento, 2005, p. 189). This allowed al Qaeda to plan major attacks, including the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. This mirrors the Stratey of Tension concept to create the new global threat after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Black Flags by Joby Warrick (2015) details these bombings, which killed over 200 people and marked al Qaeda’s emergence as a global terrorist threat. Warrick writes, “The 1998 embassy bombings showcased al Qaeda’s ability to coordinate complex, multinational operations” (Warrick, 2015, p. 134). The U.S. responded with cruise missile strikes on al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, which were largely ineffective.

Late 1990s–2001: The Road to 9/11

The rise of Al Qaeda and the global reach, facilitated in large part through covert funding from intelligence organizations facilitated it being named as the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The Terror Timeline provides a detailed chronology, noting that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, an al Qaeda operative, proposed the plot in 1996, and bin Laden approved it by 1999 (Thompson, 2004, p. 189). Training for the hijackers occurred in Afghanistan and the U.S., with Ali Mohamed again playing a key role, as detailed in Triple Cross. Lance writes, “Mohamed’s 'penetration' of U.S. agencies ensured al Qaeda’s plans remained undetected” (Lance, 2006, p. 245).

Legacy of Ashes by Tim Weiner (2007) critiques the CIA’s intelligence failures, stating, “The CIA had no actionable intelligence on al Qaeda’s 9/11 plot, despite scattered warnings” (Weiner, 2007, p. 481). Similarly, The Secret History of the CIA by Joseph J. Trento (2001) notes internal dysfunction, with “rivalries between CIA and FBI hampering efforts to track al Qaeda” (Trento, 2001, p. 398). Towers of Deception by Barrie Zwicker (2006) and Coverup by Peter Lance (2004) allege government complicity in failing to prevent 9/11, though they focus more on conspiracy theories than al Qaeda’s actions. Zwicker claims, “The 9/11 attacks were enabled by deliberate intelligence failures” (Zwicker, 2006, p. 156), while Lance argues, “The FBI’s mishandling of Ali Mohamed left the U.S. vulnerable” (Lance, 2004, p. 203).

The Pinochet File by Peter Kornbluh (2003) briefly references al Qaeda in the context of post-9/11 security policies, noting that “the Bush administration’s focus on al Qaeda shaped its approach to global counterterrorism” (Kornbluh, 2003, p. 480). This suggests al Qaeda’s centrality to U.S. policy after the attacks.

Post-9/11: Decline and Evolution Ghost Wars describes the U.S. campaign, noting, “By 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership was scattered, but its ideology persisted” (Coll, 2004, p. 567). Black Flags details al Qaeda’s evolution, with affiliates like al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) emerging under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Warrick writes, “AQI’s brutality in Iraq redefined al Qaeda’s image, alienating even some jihadists” (Warrick, 2015, p. 256).

Deal with the Devil by Peter Lance (2013) examines the FBI’s continued struggles to counter al Qaeda, particularly through its 'mishandling' of informants. Lance notes, “Post-9/11, the FBI’s failures allowed al Qaeda operatives to evade capture” (Lance, 2013, p. 312). This 'failure' is how the drug trafficking, facilitated by the CIA's involvement in it, continues unabated. Twilight of the Shadow Government by Kevin Shipp (2024) critiques the broader intelligence community, arguing that “the deep state’s focus on power obscured the al Qaeda threat” (Shipp, 2024, p. 178).