Al-Qaeda

Late 1970s–1980s: Origins in the Afghan-Soviet War

The roots of al Qaeda lie in the Afghan-Soviet War (1979–1989), where the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies supported mujahideen fighters against the Soviet Union. Ghost Wars by Steve Coll (2004) provides a detailed account of this period, noting that the CIA funneled billions of dollars through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to arm and train Afghan and Arab fighters, including those who would later form al Qaeda. Coll explains, “The CIA’s covert role in Afghanistan… helped create the conditions for the rise of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network” (Coll, 2004, p. 66).

The influx of Arab volunteers, inspired by anti-Soviet jihad, included Osama bin Laden, who arrived in Afghanistan in the early 1980s to support the mujahideen. The Politics of Heroin by Alfred W. McCoy (1972, revised 2003) contextualizes this period by highlighting how the CIA’s alliances with drug traffickers in Afghanistan facilitated the heroin trade to fund covert operations. While not directly naming al Qaeda, McCoy notes that “the CIA’s covert operations in Afghanistan transformed the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands into the world’s largest heroin-producing region” (McCoy, 2003, p. 478). This drug trade provided financial networks that later supported militant groups, including those associated with bin Laden.

A Mosque in Munich by Ian Johnson (2010) adds another layer, detailing how the CIA supported the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups in the West to counter Soviet influence. Johnson describes how the CIA’s backing of Islamic networks in Europe, particularly through mosques like the one in Munich, created ideological and logistical hubs that later fed into al Qaeda’s recruitment. He writes, “The CIA’s support for Islamist movements… laid the groundwork for the global jihadist movement” (Johnson, 2010, p. 112).

According to Paul Williams

"In September 1979 (Nur Muhammad) Taraki was killed in a coup organized by Afghan military officers. Hafizullah Amin was installed as the country's new president. Amin had impeccable western credentials. He had been educated at Columbia University and the University of Wisconsin. He had served as the president of the Afghan Students Association, which had been funded by the Asia Foundation, a CIA front."

After the Coup

After the coup, he met regularly with US Embassy officials, while the CIA continued to fund Hekmatyar's rebels in Pakistan. Fearing a fundamentalist, US-backed regime at its border, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. The CIA got what it wanted. The holy war had begun. For the next decade, black aid-amounting to more than $3 billion-would be poured into Afghanistan to support the holy warriors, making it the most expensive covert operation in US history. Such vast expenditures demanded an exponential increase in poppy production, which Hekmatyar and his fellow jihadists were pleased to provide.

The State Department Response

The war in Afghanistan delighted state department officials, including Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski. Voicing the utopian vision of what author Chalmers Johnson called the "military-industrial complex," Brzezinski wrote of the plans to control Eurasia, including Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan: For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia.... Now a non-Eurasian power is preeminent in Eurasia-and America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained...To put it in a terminology that harkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires, the three great imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together.14 Brzezinski and fellow members of his "over-world" (the elite group which puppeteers events to bring about a "new world order") realized that the concept of democracy and freedom could never galvanize the scattered tribes and peoples of Central Asia. The people could only be unified by the cause of Allah since they were overwhelmingly Islamic."

Williams' goes on to explain what Operation Gladio looked like in Afghanistan..."in the view of American geostrategists, offered many be efits, including the possible downfall of the Soviet Union and the possibility of gaining access and control over the vast natural gas and o resources of Eurasia.

Operation Cyclone

Months before the Soviet invasion in 1979, the CIA launched Operation Cyclone, an attempt to destabilize the Soviet Union by spreading militant Islam throughout the central Asian republics, Eventually, this operation would serve to create hundreds of Islamic terror organizations, including al-Qaeda, al-Jihad, the Ulema Union of Afghani stan, the Salafi Group for Proselytism and Combat, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Harkat ul-Ansar, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Jamiat Ulema-+ Pakistan, Lashkar e-Taiba, and the al-Jihad Group. It would also give rise to terror attacks that would kill and maim millions of people throughout the world and the dream of a New Islamic World Order, which would be espoused by Fethullah Gülen and his disciples.

BCCI

The BCCI, in 1972, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was set up in Karachi by Agha Hasan Abedi, a financier who had deep connections to Pakistan's underworld, the Turkish babas (members of Turkey's underworld), and the oil-rich sheikhs of Abu Dhabi. It represented the ideal spot for the CIA to set up a laundry within the Golden Crescent. Thanks to the Agency, the BCCI was registered in Luxembourg and soon mushroomed into a vast criminal enterprise with four hundred branches in seventyeight countries, including the First American Bank in Washington, DC, the National Bank of Georgia, and the Independence Bank of Encino, California.

Virtually free from scrutiny, it engaged not only in laundering the heroin proceeds but also arms trafficking on a grand scale-including the sale of French-made jet fighters to Chile and Chinese silkworm missiles to Saudi Arabia. By 1985, it had become the seventh-largest financial institution in the world, handling the money for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega, Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal, al-Qaeda chieftain Osama bin Laden, Liberian president Samuel Doe, and leading members of the Medellin Cartel. Prominent spooks, including CIA director William Casey, made regular visits to the BCCI's headquarters in Karachi, making the Pakistani city the new haven for covert operations.

The bank served the Agency in a myriad of ways, by paying bribes, providing "young beauties from Lahore" (human trafficking) and funneling case for assassins...the BCCI made use of the Atlanta branch of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), an Italian bank with ties to the IOR (Vatican Bank). Henry Kissinger sat on BNL's international advisory board, along with Brent Scowcroft, who became President George H. W. Bush's national security advisor. (The National Security Council is where Operation Gladio operations are approved)

John R. Bath, an alleged CIA operative, became one of BCCI's directors. While serving the Pakistani bank, Bath was the co-owner of Arbusto Energy, a Texan oil company, with future president George W. Bush. Kamal Adham, a fellow BCCI official, served, according to the Kerry Commission as "the principle liaison for the CIA in the entire Middle East from mid 1060-s through 1979."

"Realizing it would be financially advantageous to train the new recruits on American soil, Sheikh Gilani, with the help of the CIA, set up paramilitary training camps in rural areas throughout the country, including Hancock New York; Red House, Virginia; Commerce, Georgia; York, South Carolina; Dover, Tennessee; Buena Vista, Colorado; Macon, Georgia; Squaw Valley, California; Marion, Alabama; and Talihina, Oklahoma.

The Birth of Al-Qaeda

By 1985, the international press began to report that an number of African American Muslims-all related to the camps set up by Gilani --had joined the ranks of the mujahideen in Afghanistan and that several had been killed in action. When questioned, several of the jihadis imported from America would testify that they were agents of the CIA THE AL-QAEDA CELL To provide more support for the mujahideen, the CIA used Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's mentor, to set up a cell of al-Qaeda within Masjid al-Farooq on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn, New York.

The cell, known as the al-Kifah Refugee Center, acted as a front for the transference of funds, weapons, and recruits to Afghanistan. Throughout the 1980s, this militant organization received over $2 million a year and Masjid al-Farooq became a very wealthy institution.' During this time, Azzam spent a great deal of time in Brooklyn. In a 1988 videotape, he can be seen and heard telling a large crowd of African Americans that "blood and martyrdom are the only way to create a Muslim society."

Late 1980s: Formation of al Qaeda

In 1988, Osama bin Laden (with funding from the CIA) formally established al Qaeda in Peshawar, Pakistan, to continue jihad beyond the Afghan-Soviet War. Ghost Wars recounts this moment, stating, “Bin Laden founded al Qaeda to serve as a base—literally, ‘the base’ in Arabic—for coordinating global jihadist efforts” (Coll, 2004, p. 201). The group aimed to unite Arab fighters from the Afghan war and channel their efforts.

The Terror Timeline by Paul Thompson (2004) corroborates this, noting that al Qaeda’s early infrastructure relied on financial networks established during the Afghan war, including bin Laden’s personal wealth and connections to Saudi donors. Thompson writes, “By 1989, al Qaeda had established training camps and financial channels that would sustain its operations for decades” (Thompson, 2004, p. 45). The CIA tied bank, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, aided with this endeavor.

The inhabitants of the five republics of the Soviet Union (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), who shared a common Turkish heritage and remained devoutly Islamic, were supportive of the mujahideen in their struggle against their Communist overlords. This support, combined with the massive amount of Muslim recruits to the great jihad from the Arab world, served to create a creeping sense of futility among the Soviet troops.

To drive the "evil empire" to the point of total collapse, the CIA continued to infuse the holy war with munitions and money, until the war in Afghanistan became the Agency's most expensive covert undertaking. By 1985, the Afghan rebels were receiving $250 million a year in dirty money from the CIA to battle the 115,000 Soviet troops occupying the country. This figure was double the number of Soviet troops who had been deployed to Afghanistan in 1984. The annual payments to the Muslim guerrillas reached nearly $1 billion by 1988.

By this time, the CIA was also shipping highly sophisticated weaponry, including Stinger missiles, to the jihadists, whom they mistakenly viewed as "freedom fighters." In an effort to supply recruits to the jihad, the CIA once again focused its attention on America's black community. This development was understandable. The Agency realized that millions of African Americans, who felt disenfranchised by the system, had converted to Islam, which they saw as "the black man's religion."

This movement, prompted by such black leaders as Timothy Drew ("Noble Drew Ali"), Elijah Poole ("Elijah Muhammad"), and Malcolm Little ("Malcolm X"), had given rise to hundreds of mosques within America's inner cities.³ By 1980, CIA began to send hundreds of militant Muslim missionaries, all members of the radical Tablighi Jamaat, into American mosques to call on young black men to take up arms in the holy war to liberate their Muslim brothers. Sheikh Mubarak Gilani, one of the first of these missionaries to arrive, convinced scores of members of the Yasin Mosque in Brooklyn to head off to guerrilla training camps in Pakistan with an offer of thousands in cash and the promise of seventy houris in seventh heaven, if they were killed in action. The cash came from the CIA's coffers."

Early 1990s: Expansion and Early Attacks

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, al Qaeda shifted its focus to new targets, particularly the United States, which bin Laden viewed as an imperialist force supporting corrupt Middle Eastern regimes. Ghost Wars details al Qaeda’s relocation to Sudan in 1991, where bin Laden established training camps and businesses to fund operations. Coll notes, “Sudan provided al Qaeda a safe haven to plan attacks and build its global network” (Coll, 2004, p. 240).

1000 Years for Revenge by Peter Lance (2003) and Triple Cross by Peter Lance (2006) highlight al Qaeda’s early operations in the United States, particularly through Ali Mohamed, a double agent who infiltrated the CIA, Green Berets, and FBI while working for bin Laden. Lance writes, “Ali Mohamed was al Qaeda’s master spy, training operatives in New York and providing intelligence to bin Laden” (Lance, 2003, p. 78). Mohamed’s activities facilitated the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, carried out by al Qaeda-linked operatives like Ramzi Yousef. Triple Cross adds, “The 1993 bombing was al Qaeda’s first major strike on U.S. soil, exposing FBI vulnerabilities” (Lance, 2006, p. 112). Keep in mind that the CIA and NSA were monitoring al Qaeda, the mosques and all communication during this period.

The Forty Years War by Len Colodny (2009) provides geopolitical context, noting that U.S. neoconservative policies in the Middle East, including support for Israel and military presence in Saudi Arabia, was knowingly used by the intelligence serves to serve as a basis to exploit al Qaeda terror. While not directly citing al Qaeda, Colodny argues, “U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s radicalized Islamist movements” (Colodny, 2009, p. 245), aligning with al Qaeda’s growing rhetoric. Peter Tomsen served as U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan with the rank of Ambassador from 1989 to 1992, appointed by President George H.W. Bush. In this role, he had close relationships with Afghan leaders, including President Hamid Karzai and Ahmad Shah Masood, and dealt with senior Taliban, warlords, and religious leaders involved in the region's conflicts. These developments were being tracked by the State Department and coordinated with the CIA.

Gary C Schroen is explicitly identified as having served as CIA Station Chief for both Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s. He is described as one of the agency's foremost experts on the Near East. In the late 1990s, he was involved in the CIA's Mission Center for Counterterrorism and highly involved in attempts to kill or capture Osama bin Laden. The CIA station chief, that worked to create al-Qaeda and bin Laden was in charge of finding and capturing him. He later became Deputy Chief of the CIA's Near East Division in its Directorate of Operations from 1999 to 2001. After 9/11, he famously led the first team of CIA officers to enter Afghanistan.

Meanwhile in next door Pakistan, Milton Bearden: Served as CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986-1989. He was instrumental in the escalation of CIA activities in Afghanistan during the latter part of the Soviet-Afghan War. Robert L. Grenier served as station chief in Islamabad from 1999-2001.

Mid-1990s: Growth and Global Reach

By the mid-1990s, al Qaeda expanded its operations, targeting U.S. interests globally while still receiving support from the CIA. Ghost Wars describes bin Laden’s 1996 return to Afghanistan, where al Qaeda established extensive training camps which mirror the terrorist training camps set up by Otto Skorzeny for Operation Gladio cells in NATO countries. Coll writes, “By 1996, al Qaeda had become a sophisticated terrorist organization with global ambitions” (Coll, 2004, p. 323) just like the Operation Gladio terrorists. That year, bin Laden issued his first public fatwa, declaring war on the United States. While this was going on

Prelude to Terror by Joseph J. Trento (2005) examines the CIA’s failure to prioritize al Qaeda as a threat, despite warnings from analysts. Trento notes, “The CIA underestimated bin Laden’s capabilities, focusing instead on state sponsors like Iran” (Trento, 2005, p. 189). This allowed al Qaeda to plan major attacks, including the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. This mirrors the Stratey of Tension concept to create the new global threat after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Black Flags by Joby Warrick (2015) details these bombings, which killed over 200 people and marked al Qaeda’s emergence as a global terrorist threat. Warrick writes, “The 1998 embassy bombings showcased al Qaeda’s ability to coordinate complex, multinational operations” (Warrick, 2015, p. 134). The U.S. responded with cruise missile strikes on al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, which were largely ineffective.

Late 1990s–2001: The Road to 9/11

The rise of Al Qaeda and the global reach, facilitated in large part through covert funding from intelligence organizations facilitated it being named as the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The Terror Timeline provides a detailed chronology, noting that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, an al Qaeda operative, proposed the plot in 1996, and bin Laden approved it by 1999 (Thompson, 2004, p. 189). Training for the hijackers occurred in Afghanistan and the U.S., with Ali Mohamed again playing a key role, as detailed in Triple Cross. Lance writes, “Mohamed’s 'penetration' of U.S. agencies ensured al Qaeda’s plans remained undetected” (Lance, 2006, p. 245).

Legacy of Ashes by Tim Weiner (2007) critiques the CIA’s intelligence failures, stating, “The CIA had no actionable intelligence on al Qaeda’s 9/11 plot, despite scattered warnings” (Weiner, 2007, p. 481). Similarly, The Secret History of the CIA by Joseph J. Trento (2001) notes internal dysfunction, with “rivalries between CIA and FBI hampering efforts to track al Qaeda” (Trento, 2001, p. 398). Towers of Deception by Barrie Zwicker (2006) and Coverup by Peter Lance (2004) allege government complicity in failing to prevent 9/11, though they focus more on conspiracy theories than al Qaeda’s actions. Zwicker claims, “The 9/11 attacks were enabled by deliberate intelligence failures” (Zwicker, 2006, p. 156), while Lance argues, “The FBI’s mishandling of Ali Mohamed left the U.S. vulnerable” (Lance, 2004, p. 203).

The Pinochet File by Peter Kornbluh (2003) briefly references al Qaeda in the context of post-9/11 security policies, noting that “the Bush administration’s focus on al Qaeda shaped its approach to global counterterrorism” (Kornbluh, 2003, p. 480). This suggests al Qaeda’s centrality to U.S. policy after the attacks.

Post-9/11: Decline and Evolution

Ghost Wars describes the U.S. campaign, noting, “By 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership was scattered, but its ideology persisted” (Coll, 2004, p. 567). Black Flags details al Qaeda’s evolution, with affiliates like al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) emerging under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Warrick writes, “AQI’s brutality in Iraq redefined al Qaeda’s image, alienating even some jihadists” (Warrick, 2015, p. 256).

Deal with the Devil by Peter Lance (2013) examines the FBI’s continued struggles to counter al Qaeda, particularly through its 'mishandling' of informants. Lance notes, “Post-9/11, the FBI’s failures allowed al Qaeda operatives to evade capture” (Lance, 2013, p. 312). This 'failure' is how the drug trafficking, facilitated by the CIA's involvement in it, continues unabated. Twilight of the Shadow Government by Kevin Shipp (2024) critiques the broader intelligence community, arguing that “the deep state’s focus on power obscured the al Qaeda threat” (Shipp, 2024, p. 178).

According to Paul Williams' book Operation Gladio:

By 1992, al-Farooq mosque had become a haven for Arabian veterans from the great jihad in Afghanistan, who were granted special passports to enter the United States by the CIA. A feud erupted between the older African American members of the mosque and the Arab newcomers, which resulted in the murder of Mustafa Shalabi, the fiery imam of the mosque, on March 1, 1991. The crime has never been solved."

"A New High Thanks to the CIA, heroin production in Afghanistan rose from 400 tons in 1971 to 1,800 tons in 1979, and a network of laboratories was set up by the mujahideen along the Afghan-Pakistan border." The morphine base was transported by caravans of trucks from the Helmand Valley through northern Iran to the Anatolian plains of Turkey. Business was booming. In 1979, the "flood" of heroin from Afghanistan inundated the United States capturing over 60 percent of the market.

In New York City alone, the mob sold two tons of smack, which registered a "dramatic increase in purity." Heroin addiction in the states climbed back to 450,000. Within a year, street sales increased by 22 percent and the addiction rate reached 500,000. It was an enormous development for the Rockefeller family. The cash from the drug trade flowed into CIA-controlled banks, including the Bank of Credit and Commerce, to America's most prestigious financial institutions, including Citibank, in which the Rockefeller family held controlling interest."

The rise in heroin usage had enormous ramifications on the CIA Michel Chossudovsky, the noted Canadian economist, explains: The excessive accumulation of money wealth from the proceeds of the drug trade has transformed the CIA into a powerful financial entity. The latter cooperates through a web of corporate shells, banks, and financial institutions wielding tremendous power and influence. These CIA sponsored "corporations" have, over time, been meshed into the mainstay of the business and corporate establishment, not only in weapons production and the oil business, but also in banking and financial services, real estate, etc.

In turn, billions of narco dollars are channeled-with the support of the CIA-into spheres of "legitimate" banking, where they are used to finance bona fide investments in a variety of economic activities. But all this came to a screeching halt on January 27, 2000, when Mullah Omar and the leaders of the Taliban announced their plans to ban poppy production within the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Thanks to the ban the opium poppy harvest fell from 4,600 tons in 1999 to 81 tons in 2001. The situation had to be addressed by the military/industrial complex in a forceful way.

While heroin was one cause of the war on terrorism, oil was another The situation in Afghanistan had become worrisome to the House of Rockefeller, which had been instrumental in bringing the Taliban to power in 1996. Through the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal), the Rockefellers had arranged to provide the group with weapons and military instructors. This aid had enabled the Taliban to capture Kabul and to oust Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbānī from office. The Unocal gifts of arms and advisors were given with the belief that the Taliban would provide assistance in the creation of a massive oil pipeline that would run from the oil wells of Turkmenistan through the mountains of Afghanistan to the port city of Karachi, Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea...Unocal also planned through its subsidiary Centgas to build another pipeline, this one for natural gas that would follow the same route..." Brzenzinski lays out the plan in The Grand Chessboard.

Condoleezza Rice worked for Chevron (the predecessor of Standard Oil of California, she also served as Geroge W. Bush's National Security Advisor (where Gladio is managed from).