Gehlen Organization

The Gehlen Organization, often called "The Org," was a post-World War II intelligence agency established in June 1946 by U.S. occupation authorities in the U.S. zone of occupied Germany. Named after its founder, Reinhard Gehlen, a former Wehrmacht Major General and head of Nazi military intelligence on the Eastern Front (Fremde Heere Ost, or FHO), the organization served as a critical U.S. intelligence asset during the early Cold War. Comprising former members of the German Army General Staff’s 12th Department, it focused on espionage against the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, eventually becoming the precursor to West Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND) in 1956. Its history is marked by its reliance on ex-Nazis, CIA collaboration, and controversial operations, raising ethical questions about its methods and legacy.

Origins and Formation

(1945–1946) Reinhard Gehlen, born in 1902 in Erfurt, Germany, joined the Reichswehr in 1920 and rose through the ranks, becoming chief of FHO in 1942. Anticipating Germany’s defeat, he microfilmed FHO’s Soviet intelligence archives in early 1945, burying them in the Austrian Alps. On May 22, 1945, Gehlen surrendered to the U.S. Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Bavaria, offering his archives and expertise in exchange for freedom for himself and his staff. U.S. Army G-2 (intelligence), recognizing America’s lack of Soviet intelligence, accepted. Gehlen and seven senior FHO officers were removed from POW lists and transferred to Camp King, Oberursel, where they unearthed the archives. In September 1945, Gehlen and three aides were flown to the U.S. to brief the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), revealing details about Soviet military structures and OSS communist infiltrators.

In July 1946, Gehlen returned to Germany, establishing the Gehlen Organization under the cover of the “South German Industrial Development Organization” at Oberursel, later moving to a 25-acre compound in Pullach, near Munich, in December 1947, formerly a Nazi residential quarter. Starting with 350 former German intelligence officers, the Org grew to 4,000 specialists and 4,000 undercover agents (“V-men”) by the early 1950s, many ex-Wehrmacht, SS, and Sicherheitsdienst (SD) members, per *The Gehlen Organization and the Nazis* by Badis Ben Redjeb.

CIA Partnership and Operations

(1947–1956)In 1947, the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assumed oversight of the Org, providing funding, vehicles, and aircraft while Gehlen supplied manpower. The CIA’s liaison, James H. Critchfield (1949–1956), worked closely with Gehlen, though tensions arose over security flaws, as noted by CIA officer Peter Sichel. The Org’s primary mission was espionage against the Eastern Bloc, interviewing every German POW returning from Soviet captivity (1947–1955) to gather data on Soviet industries, rail systems, airfields, and ports. It infiltrated agents into the Baltic States using ex-Kriegsmarine E-boats skippered by Hans-Helmut Klose and ran Operation Rusty, a counter-espionage effort against dissident German groups.

Notable successes included Operation Bohemia, which exposed a Yugoslav spy ring in Western Europe, and uncovering a Soviet assassination unit under SMERSH, delivering a Czech-designed detonator to the CIA, per *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen* (1977). The Org also supported **Operation Sunrise**, training 5,000 anti-communist Eastern European and Russian personnel at Oberammergau in 1946 for insurgencies, some lasting until 1956 in Ukraine. However, Soviet penetration was a persistent issue; a CIA report later called it a “catastrophic” compromise, with moles like ex-SS lieutenant **Heinz Felfe** (arrested 1961) undermining operations. The 1948–1952 WIN operation in Poland, initially thought to be an anti-communist resistance, was revealed as Soviet disinformation, costing lives and resources.

The Org’s reliance on ex-Nazis drew criticism. It employed figures like Alois Brunner, Adolf Eichmann’s deputy, and facilitated “ratlines” for Nazis to escape to South America and the Middle East, including Walter Rauff to Syria, as documented in *Journal of Intelligence History* (2019). These actions, supported by U.S. funding, prioritized anti-communism over moral accountability, per *The Real Odessa* by Uki Goñi.

Transition to BND and Decline

(1956–1968) On April 1, 1956, the Gehlen Organization was transferred to the West German government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, forming the core of the BND, with Gehlen as its first president (1956–1968). Employing up to 7,000, the BND continued espionage against the Eastern Bloc, but Gehlen’s leadership faltered. His inattention, estrangement from Adenauer, and Felfe’s betrayal exposed vulnerabilities. In 1968, Gehlen was forced to retire, ending his 23-year intelligence career. He died on June 8, 1979, in Berg, Germany.

Gehlen’s memoirs and over 100,000 pages of leaked BND documents, reported by *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (2017), reveal the Org’s systematic recruitment of ex-Nazis, protected by Adenauer to counter East German subversion. The Org’s hatred of communism targeted not just Soviet regimes but also Western leftists, like socialist academic Wolfgang Abendroth, surveilled for his anti-Nazi past.

Connection to Operation Gladio

The Gehlen Organization and Operation Gladio share deep ties rooted in post-World War II anti-communist strategies driven by Western intelligence, particularly the CIA, to counter Soviet influence in Europe.

The Gehlen Organization, named after Reinhard Gehlen, a former Nazi intelligence officer who led the Wehrmacht’s Foreign Armies East during the war, was established in 1946 under U.S. Army G-2 sponsorship. After surrendering to the U.S. in 1945, Gehlen offered his Soviet expertise and archives, leading to the creation of his covert intelligence network. Operating under CIA control from 1947, it was headquartered in Pullach, near Munich, disguised as the South German Industrial Development Organization. The group employed thousands of former Wehrmacht, SS, and SD officers, including war criminals like Alois Brunner and Emil Augsburg, valued for their anti-communist stance. By the early 1950s, it had grown to include about 4,000 intelligence specialists and numerous agents across Soviet Bloc countries. Its mission focused on espionage against the Soviet Union, gathering political, economic, and technical intelligence, conducting counter-espionage through operations like Rusty, and supporting insurgencies in places like Ukraine.

Operation Gladio was a clandestine NATO and CIA-backed stay-behind operation initiated after the war to prepare for potential Soviet invasions of Western Europe. While Gladio refers specifically to Italy’s network, the term broadly covers similar operations in NATO and neutral countries like Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Turkey. These networks were designed for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and intelligence-gathering behind enemy lines. Over time, Gladio’s mission shifted to counter internal subversion, targeting left-wing movements and communist influence, leading to controversial activities, including alleged false flag operations and links to right-wing terrorism during Italy’s Years of Lead in the 1960s to 1980s. Coordinated through NATO’s Allied Clandestine Committee from 1957 and partly funded by the CIA, Gladio maintained secret arms caches and trained operatives, often including far-right extremists and former fascists.

The connection between the two lies in their shared anti-communist origins. Both emerged from U.S. and Western efforts to counter Soviet expansion, with the Gehlen Organization providing critical intelligence that informed Gladio’s strategic planning. The CIA, under figures like Allen Dulles, a key Gladio architect, relied on Gehlen’s network as a primary intelligence source in Eastern Europe, making it a natural partner in establishing stay-behind operations. Personnel overlap further linked them, as the Gehlen Organization’s recruitment of former Nazis aligned with Gladio’s inclusion of far-right elements. In Germany, the Gehlen Organization was central to Gladio’s stay-behind efforts, with operatives trained for sabotage. The CIA-supported Technische Dienst within the Bund Deutscher Jugend, a German youth organization, operated as a stay-behind network alongside the Gehlen Organization, both employing ex-Nazis and funded by the CIA from 1949 to 1955, indicating shared personnel and goals. In Italy, Gladio operatives like former fascist Junio Valerio Borghese were supported by the CIA and connected to networks Gehlen helped establish.

Operationally, the Gehlen Organization’s intelligence-gathering and counter-espionage complemented Gladio’s mission to prepare for covert resistance. Gehlen’s agents infiltrated Soviet Bloc countries, providing data that could guide Gladio’s sabotage and guerrilla plans in a Soviet invasion scenario. In West Germany, the Gehlen Organization’s SATURN stay-behind network, developed under CIA oversight, was a direct component of Gladio’s framework, training about 150 operatives for sabotage from bases in Munich, Frankfurt, Bremen, and Hannover. This network was later integrated into the Bundesnachrichtendienst when the Gehlen Organization transitioned to West German control in 1956. By 1956, the Gehlen Organization became the BND, continuing to oversee Germany’s stay-behind networks under NATO coordination. Gladio’s operations across Europe fell under NATO supervision by 1959 through the Allied Clandestine Committee, with the BND maintaining Germany’s role in this framework. Documents from the Gehlen Organization’s Pullach Operation Base, code-named ZIPPER by the CIA, reveal its role in developing stay-behind networks like SATURN, aligned with NATO’s Gladio strategy.

Both entities faced controversy for activities beyond their mandates. The Gehlen Organization’s use of war criminals and penetration by Soviet moles, such as the WIN deception in Poland, raised concerns about its reliability. Gladio’s alleged involvement in false flag operations, like the 1972 Peteano bombing in Italy linked to neo-fascist Vincenzo Vinciguerra and Gladio arms caches, and the 1980 Bologna railway station bombing, implicated far-right operatives potentially tied to Gehlen’s networks. Swiss historian Daniele Ganser suggests Gladio, rooted in Gehlen’s anti-communist framework, pursued a strategy of tension to discredit left-wing movements through terrorism. In Portugal, the Aginter Press, a Gladio-related front, was reportedly linked to the CIA and the BND, suggesting a broader network tied to Gehlen’s legacy.

The Gehlen Organization’s intelligence shaped Western perceptions of Soviet threats, justifying Gladio’s expansion across Europe. Gehlen’s reports on Soviet missile developments and East German remilitarization fueled Cold War tensions, reinforcing the need for stay-behind armies. Gladio relied on the ideological and operational groundwork laid by Gehlen’s networks, which provided recruits, intelligence, and logistical support. This synergy extended to countries like Austria, where ex-SS personnel were recruited for Gladio-style arms caches, and Turkey, where the Counter-Guerrilla network reflected Gehlen’s anti-communist ethos.

Critics highlight the moral and ethical issues of both groups’ reliance on former Nazis and far-right extremists. Historians like Robert Wolfe argue the U.S. was misled by Gehlen’s employment of war criminals, while Gladio’s links to terrorism are seen as undermining democratic institutions. Some scholars, like Philip H. J. Davies, caution against overstating their coordination, arguing that claims of a centralized NATO-led conspiracy lack evidence and misrepresent the decentralized nature of stay-behind networks. Public exposure compounded these issues, with the Gehlen Organization compromised by British press leaks in the 1950s and Gladio revealed in 1990 by Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti following investigations by magistrate Felice Casson, highlighting their shared reliance on secrecy and controversial operatives.

In summary, the Gehlen Organization was a cornerstone of the intelligence infrastructure supporting Operation Gladio. Its anti-communist personnel, intelligence networks, and CIA-backed stay-behind units like SATURN directly contributed to Gladio’s framework in Germany and beyond. Designed to counter Soviet threats, their use of former Nazis, far-right extremists, and alleged involvement in illicit activities have left a complex and troubling Cold War legacy.