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“strategy of tension”

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Revision as of 11:48, 12 May 2025 by Winggal (talk | contribs) (Created page with "==Strategy of Tension== The “strategy of tension” (strategia della tensione) was a covert campaign of state-sponsored terrorism in Italy during the “Years of Lead” (late 1960s–early 1980s), designed to destabilize the country, foster public fear, and prevent the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from gaining electoral power. Orchestrated by elements within Italian intelligence, neo-fascist groups, the Propaganda Due P2 Masonic lodge, and supported by NATO’s...")
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Strategy of Tension[edit]

The “strategy of tension” (strategia della tensione) was a covert campaign of state-sponsored terrorism in Italy during the “Years of Lead” (late 1960s–early 1980s), designed to destabilize the country, foster public fear, and prevent the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from gaining electoral power. Orchestrated by elements within Italian intelligence, neo-fascist groups, the Propaganda Due P2 Masonic lodge, and supported by NATO’s Operation Gladio and the CIA, this strategy exploited Cold War tensions to maintain right-wing dominance and justify authoritarian measures. By staging violent attacks and blaming them on left-wing groups, the perpetrators aimed to create a climate of insecurity, pushing the public to demand stronger government control and reject leftist ideologies. Historical Context:
The strategy emerged amid Italy’s polarized political landscape in the late 1960s, marked by economic struggles, student protests (1968), and labor strikes (Hot Autumn, 1969). The PCI’s growing electoral strength, peaking at 34.4% in 1976, alarmed Italy’s ruling Christian Democracy (DC) party, NATO, and the U.S., who feared a communist-led government in a key NATO ally. The Cold War’s anti-communist fervor, coupled with social unrest, provided fertile ground for covert operations. Operation Gladio, established in 1956 as a NATO “stay-behind” network to resist a Soviet invasion, was repurposed to execute internal subversion, with the CIA providing funding and strategic direction.

Operations[edit]

The strategy of tension involved orchestrating terrorist attacks—bombings, massacres, and assassinations—carried out by neo-fascist groups but falsely attributed to anarchists or leftist militants. The goal was to discredit the left, particularly the PCI, and create public demand for law-and-order policies, potentially paving the way for a right-wing coup or authoritarian regime.

The campaign relied on a network of actors, including:

• Neo-fascist groups like Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale, which provided operatives. • Gladio, which supplied explosives, training, and coordination. • P2, led by Licio Gelli, which served as a clandestine hub linking military, intelligence, political, and financial elites. • Italian intelligence (SID/SIFAR), infiltrated by P2 members like General Vito Miceli, which manipulated investigations to protect perpetrators. • CIA and NATO, which funded and endorsed the strategy to secure Italy’s anti-communist stance.

The term “strategy of tension” was coined by journalist Franco “Ciccio” Franco and later substantiated by confessions from neo-fascist Vincenzo Vinciguerra, who described it as a deliberate effort to “destabilize to stabilize” by creating chaos to reinforce state power.

Key Attacks[edit]

1 Piazza Fontana Bombing (December 12, 1969):
A bomb at Milan’s Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura killed 17 and injured 88, marking the strategy’s onset. Neo-fascists Giuseppe Pinelli and Pietro Valpreda were initially blamed, with Pinelli dying in police custody (officially a fall, likely murder). Investigations by magistrate Felice Casson revealed neo-fascist operatives, including Vinciguerra, used Gladio explosives, with SID covering up evidence to frame anarchists.

2 Peteano Bombing (May 31, 1972):
A car bomb in Peteano killed three carabinieri. Vinciguerra, convicted for the attack, admitted using C4 from Gladio caches and testified that the operation aimed to blame leftists, with SID complicity in misdirecting the investigation.

3 Italicus Express Bombing (August 4, 1974):
A bomb on the Rome-Munich train killed 12 and injured 48. Neo-fascists linked to Ordine Nuovo were suspected, with a 1981 parliamentary inquiry confirming P2 and Gladio’s role in financing and instigating the attack.

4 Bologna Train Station Bombing (August 2, 1980):
The deadliest attack, killing 85 and injuring over 200, targeted Bologna’s central station. Neo-fascists Valerio Fioravanti and Francesca Mambro of the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR) were convicted, but evidence pointed to Gladio-supplied explosives and P2 coordination. The attack aimed to disrupt Bologna’s left-leaning governance.

5 Other Incidents:
Over 150 attacks occurred, including the Brescia Piazza della Loggia bombing (May 28, 1974, 8 deaths) and numerous smaller bombings. Assassinations, such as that of magistrate Vittorio Occorsio (1976), who investigated neo-fascist groups, were linked to the strategy to silence critics.

Propaganda Due P2[edit]

The P2 lodge, under Licio Gelli’s leadership, was the linchpin, with members including military officers, intelligence chiefs, and banker Roberto Calvi of Banco Ambrosiano. P2 facilitated Gladio’s operations by: • Funding: Calvi laundered CIA and Mafia funds through the Vatican Bank, supporting terrorist acts and anti-communist initiatives like Poland’s Solidarity and Operation Condor in Latin America. Banco Ambrosiano’s 1982 collapse exposed a $1.3 billion shortfall tied to these activities. • Coordination: Gelli recruited neo-fascist operatives like Stefano Delle Chiaie, implicated in Piazza Fontana, and ensured attacks aligned with strategic goals. P2’s influence over SID misdirected investigations, protecting perpetrators. • Political Cover: Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, tied to P2, shielded Gladio’s activities, as did other P2-linked officials, ensuring impunity. Gladio provided logistical support, including explosives from its 139 NASCO caches, and trained operatives in sabotage. CIA funding, secured by Gelli through 1974 meetings with U.S. officials like Alexander Haig, sustained the campaign, with operative Richard Brenneke alleging $1–10 million monthly payments to P2 (denied by the CIA). Political Subversion:
The strategy extended beyond terrorism to political destabilization: • Golpe Borghese Coup (December 8, 1970): Neo-fascist Junio Valerio Borghese, backed by Gladio and P2, attempted to overthrow the government, with Gelli tasked to arrest President Giuseppe Saragat. The coup failed due to internal disputes but signaled the strategy’s authoritarian ambitions. • Aldo Moro’s Murder (March 16–May 9, 1978): The Red Brigades kidnapped and killed former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who sought a DC-PCI alliance. Investigations, including by magistrate Gherardo Colombo, suggested Gladio and P2 infiltrated the Brigades to ensure Moro’s death, thwarting his “Historic Compromise.” Andreotti’s refusal to negotiate during the crisis aligned with anti-communist objectives.

The strategy unraveled in 1981 when a police raid on Gelli’s villa uncovered P2’s membership list, revealing its infiltration of Italy’s elite and ties to Gladio. Andreotti’s 1990 parliamentary admission confirmed Gladio’s existence, claiming it was defensive, but Casson’s investigations and Vinciguerra’s confessions exposed its terrorist role. Over 2,000 deaths were attributed to political violence, with the strategy eroding trust in institutions. Trials in the 1990s convicted some neo-fascists, but Gelli, Calvi (murdered in 1982), and others evaded full accountability. Declassifications, like those under Mario Draghi in 2021, continue to clarify the strategy’s scope, though many archives remain sealed.

Conclusion[edit]

The strategy of tension was a chilling example of state-sponsored terrorism, where Gladio, P2, and their CIA-NATO backers manipulated Italy’s democracy to suppress leftist influence. It fueled the Years of Lead’s violence, deepened political polarization, and left a lasting scar on Italian society, with unresolved questions about the full extent of foreign and domestic complicity. The strategy’s exposure underscored the dangers of covert operations prioritizing geopolitical agendas over democratic principles.