Fethullah Gulen

Overview:

Muhammed Fethullah Gülen (April 27, 1941 – October 20, 2024) was a Turkish Islamic scholar, preacher, and leader of the Hizmet movement, a global network promoting education, interfaith dialogue, and civic engagement rooted in a moderate, Sufi-inspired interpretation of Islam. Once an ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Gülen became a polarizing figure, accused by the Turkish government of orchestrating the 2016 coup attempt, leading to his designation as the head of a terrorist organization (FETÖ). He lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania from 1999 until his death. Allegations of connections to Al-Qaeda, particularly through the Tahşiye group, have been raised but are heavily disputed and lack conclusive evidence.

Personal Life:

Born in Korucuk, near Erzurum, Turkey, on April 27, 1941 (state documents confirm this date, though some early accounts cite November 10, 1938, possibly for political symbolism tied to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s death). Gülen was born to Ramiz, an imam, and Refia, a Qur’an teacher, in a conservative, Sufi-influenced community.

Gülen completed primary school but was unable to pursue formal secondary education due to his family’s relocation. He received informal religious education from his parents and local scholars, mastering Arabic and Qur’anic recitation. Influenced by Said Nursi’s Nur movement, which reconciled Islam with modernity, Gülen studied works by Nursi, Sufi poets, and Western thinkers like Kant, Shakespeare, and Sartre through self-education.

Gülen never married and lived a reclusive life in Pennsylvania, focusing on spiritual and intellectual pursuits. He authored numerous books, including Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism and Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance. Gülen died on October 20, 2024, at age 83 in a U.S. hospital, likely from complications related to heart and kidney failure. His death was announced by Herkul, a website run by his followers.

Career:

• Early Preaching: In 1958, Gülen earned a state preacher’s license and began preaching in Edirne, later moving to Izmir in 1966. His sermons blended religious themes with social, economic, and scientific issues, attracting a wide audience, including academics and students. He established “ışık evleri” (lighthouses), boarding houses to support student education, laying the foundation for the Hizmet movement.

• Hizmet Movement: By the 1980s, Gülen’s followers built a global network of schools, charities, media outlets, and businesses in over 140 countries, with assets estimated at $20–50 billion by 2015. The movement emphasized education, interfaith dialogue, and a moderate Islam compatible with democracy and science. Gülen met with global religious leaders, including Pope John Paul II and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, to promote tolerance.

• Political Alliances and Fallout: Initially aligned with Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) from 2002, Gülen’s followers supported the AKP against Turkey’s secular elite, securing key government positions. The alliance fractured in 2011, culminating in 2013 when Hizmet-linked investigations exposed AKP corruption, prompting Erdoğan to curb the movement’s influence.

• Exile in the U.S.: In 1999, Gülen moved to Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania, citing health reasons (heart condition and diabetes), though critics link his departure to a Turkish investigation for undermining the secular state. He was convicted in absentia in 2000. From his Pennsylvania compound, he continued leading Hizmet, issuing statements on peace and education.

2016 Coup Attempt and Aftermath:

• Accusations: Erdoğan accused Gülen of masterminding the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, which killed over 250 people and involved rogue military factions. The Turkish government labeled Hizmet the “Fethullahist Terror Organization” (FETÖ), arresting tens of thousands and purging over 100,000 from government, military, and education sectors. Gülen denied involvement, condemning the coup and accusing Erdoğan of exploiting it to consolidate power. U.S. authorities rejected Turkey’s extradition requests, citing insufficient evidence.

• Criticism and Defense: Supporters view Gülen as a peace advocate unjustly vilified, comparing him to figures like Gandhi or Rumi. Critics, including Erdoğan, likened him to Osama bin Laden, alleging he ran a covert network to seize state control. The crackdown targeted Hizmet’s schools, media (e.g., Zaman Daily), and businesses, with allegations of torture against detained followers. Documented Al-Qaeda Connections:

• Tahşiye Group Allegations: In 2015, two law firms (Amsterdam & Partners LLP and Fox Rothschild LLP) filed a complaint in the U.S. against Gülen, alleging he orchestrated a conspiracy against the Tahşiye group, a radical Turkish Islamist organization with purported Al-Qaeda ties. The complaint claimed Gülen used his influence over Turkish police and judiciary to target Tahşiye, citing a 2010 sermon where he allegedly likened Tahşiye to Al-Qaeda and predicted their involvement in violence. Turkish police raids on Tahşiye in 2010 uncovered weapons, explosives, and evidence of members training in Afghanistan, with leader Mehmet Doğan publicly praising Osama bin Laden.

• Details of the Case: The firms alleged Gülen’s loyalists in Turkey planted evidence, fabricated warrants, and conducted illegal wiretaps to frame Tahşiye members, detaining them for up to 20 months. The complaint suggested Gülen’s actions were motivated by a desire to suppress a rival Islamist group. However, observers and jurists have criticized the investigation as “ludicrous,” arguing it was a Turkish government effort to frame Gülen and justify the FETÖ label. No definitive evidence links Gülen directly to Al-Qaeda; instead, the allegations stem from his supposed targeting of an Al-Qaeda-linked group.

Legacy: • Gülen’s Hizmet movement established hundreds of schools and organizations worldwide, earning praise for promoting education and dialogue but criticism for its alleged “cultish hierarchy” and influence in Turkish institutions. His moderate Islamic vision, rooted in Sufism and Nursi’s teachings, contrasts with extremist ideologies, though his political fallout with Erdoğan defined his later years. The Al-Qaeda allegations remain a contested footnote, overshadowed by his broader advocacy for peace and pluralism. Sources: • Britannica, “Fethullah Gülen,” April 22, 2025. • Wikipedia, “Fethullah Gülen” and “Gülen Movement,” October 2024. • Al Jazeera, “Fethullah Gulen: From Presidential Ally to Turkey’s Alleged Coup Mastermind,” October 21, 2024. • Fethullah Gülen’s Official Web Site, various entries, 2011–2025. • The Washington Post, “Fethullah Gulen, Muslim Cleric and Target of Turkey’s Erdogan, Dies at 83,” October 21, 2024. Note: If you seek further details on specific aspects of Gülen’s life, the 2016 coup, or the Tahşiye allegations, please clarify, and I can provide a more focused analysis.

Documented CIA Connections of Fethullah Gülen Fethullah Gülen (April 27, 1941 – October 20, 2024), the Turkish Islamic scholar and leader of the Hizmet movement, has been the subject of speculation regarding connections to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), particularly due to his long-term residence in the United States and his political conflicts with the Turkish government. Below is an analysis of documented claims and evidence regarding any CIA connections, based on available sources up to May 28, 2025.

Overview of Allegations Gülen’s critics, particularly the Turkish government under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have repeatedly alleged that he and his Hizmet movement were supported or influenced by the CIA, especially in the context of the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, which Erdoğan labeled the work of the “Fethullahist Terror Organization” (FETÖ). These claims often stem from Gülen’s residence in Pennsylvania since 1999, his movement’s global reach, and its perceived alignment with U.S. interests during the Cold War and post-9/11 era. However, concrete evidence linking Gülen directly to the CIA is scarce and heavily debated, with most allegations rooted in political rhetoric rather than verifiable documentation.

Documented Claims and Evidence 1 Turkish Government Allegations: ◦ Context: After the 2013 fallout between Gülen and Erdoğan, and especially following the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, the Turkish government accused Gülen of being a CIA asset or collaborator. Erdoğan and his allies claimed the CIA backed Gülen to destabilize Turkey, pointing to his U.S. residency and the Hizmet movement’s extensive network of schools and organizations in over 140 countries, including in regions strategic to U.S. interests (e.g., Central Asia, Africa). ◦ Specific Claims: Turkish officials, including Erdoğan, alleged that the CIA facilitated Gülen’s 1999 move to the U.S. and protected him from extradition after 2016. Pro-government media in Turkey, such as Yeni Şafak, published articles claiming Gülen’s Pennsylvania compound was a CIA front and that Hizmet schools in Central Asia were used to gather intelligence or promote U.S. geopolitical goals against Russia and China. ◦ Evidence: No declassified U.S. or Turkish documents substantiate these claims. The U.S. government rejected Turkey’s extradition requests for Gülen in 2016 and beyond, citing insufficient evidence of his involvement in the coup. The FBI investigated Gülen’s activities in the U.S., including a 2018–2020 probe into Hizmet-linked schools for alleged visa fraud and misuse of federal funds, but found no evidence of espionage or CIA collaboration. The Turkish claims rely heavily on circumstantial factors, such as Gülen’s U.S. residency and meetings with American officials, which are standard for prominent exiles. 2 Hizmet’s Global Network and CIA Speculation: ◦ Context: The Hizmet movement’s establishment of schools, cultural centers, and businesses in Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East during the 1990s and 2000s led to speculation that these institutions served as fronts for CIA intelligence-gathering, particularly in former Soviet states where the U.S. sought influence post-Cold War. Gülen’s moderate, pro-Western Islamic ideology was seen as aligning with U.S. efforts to counter radical Islam and Soviet influence. ◦ Specific Claims: A 2008 RAND Corporation report noted that Gülen’s schools in Central Asia promoted a secular, pro-Western education model, which some analysts suggested aligned with U.S. soft power strategies. Critics, including Russian and Turkish officials, claimed these schools could have been used to collect intelligence or foster pro-American sentiment, though no direct CIA link was proven. A leaked 2009 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Ankara (via WikiLeaks) described Gülen’s movement as influential but did not mention CIA involvement. ◦ Evidence: No public records or declassified documents confirm that Hizmet institutions were CIA fronts. The schools were primarily funded by Turkish businessmen and focused on education in science, math, and English, often with local government approval. Allegations of espionage remain speculative, driven by geopolitical rivalries rather than concrete proof. 3 U.S. Residency and Legal Status: ◦ Context: Gülen’s move to Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania, in 1999, officially for medical treatment, raised questions about why the U.S. granted him residency despite his 2000 conviction in Turkey for undermining the secular state. His green card application in 2002 was initially denied but approved in 2008 after support from former U.S. officials, including ex-CIA officer George Fidas, who wrote a letter endorsing Gülen’s contributions to education and interfaith dialogue. ◦ Specific Claims: Turkish media and officials cited the involvement of Fidas and other U.S. figures (e.g., former Ambassador Morton Abramowitz) in Gülen’s immigration case as evidence of CIA protection. They argued that the CIA facilitated Gülen’s stay to use him as a geopolitical asset against Turkey or other regional powers. ◦ Evidence: The letters supporting Gülen’s green card, including Fidas’s, are publicly documented in court records from his 2008 immigration case. However, they focus on Gülen’s educational and religious contributions, not intelligence activities. Fidas’s involvement reflects his post-CIA academic role rather than an active agency operation. No declassified evidence or credible testimony confirms CIA sponsorship of Gülen’s residency. 4 2016 Coup Attempt and CIA Rumors: ◦ Context: The failed 2016 coup attempt, which killed over 250 people, intensified allegations of CIA involvement, with Erdoğan’s government claiming Gülen acted as a U.S. proxy to overthrow the Turkish state. Pro-government narratives suggested the CIA trained or funded coup plotters through Gülen’s network. ◦ Specific Claims: Turkish media pointed to U.S. inaction on extradition and Gülen’s Pennsylvania base as evidence of CIA complicity. Some reports alleged that U.S. military personnel at Incirlik Air Base, a NATO facility, were involved, though these claims were dismissed by U.S. officials. ◦ Evidence: No credible evidence links the CIA to the coup or Gülen’s alleged role. The U.S. State Department and CIA condemned the coup, and investigations found no U.S. involvement. Gülen himself denied orchestrating the coup, and the lack of extraditable evidence weakened Turkey’s case. The allegations appear to be part of Erdoğan’s broader campaign to vilify Gülen and suppress Hizmet.

Critical Analysis • Lack of Direct Evidence: Despite extensive Turkish government claims, no declassified documents, credible whistleblower accounts, or independent investigations confirm a direct CIA connection to Gülen or Hizmet. The allegations rely on circumstantial factors: Gülen’s U.S. residency, his movement’s global presence, and endorsements from U.S. figures. These are insufficient to establish an operational link. • Political Motivations: The CIA accusations are largely driven by Erdoğan’s need to justify the post-2016 purges, which targeted over 100,000 individuals and dismantled Hizmet’s infrastructure in Turkey. Labeling Gülen a CIA asset aligns with anti-Western sentiment in Turkey and deflects attention from domestic political failures. • Hizmet’s Ideology and U.S. Interests: Gülen’s moderate Islam, emphasizing democracy and interfaith dialogue, aligned broadly with U.S. soft power goals post-9/11, particularly in countering radical Islam. However, this ideological overlap does not equate to CIA control or funding. Hizmet’s funding came primarily from Turkish donors, not U.S. agencies. • Public Sentiment: X posts and Turkish media often amplify the CIA narrative, with some users calling Gülen a “CIA puppet” or linking his Pennsylvania compound to covert operations. Conversely, Gülen’s supporters argue these claims are propaganda, pointing to his consistent anti-terrorism stance and lack of incriminating evidence.

Conclusion Fethullah Gülen has no conclusively documented connections to the CIA. Allegations stem from Turkish government narratives, fueled by his U.S. residency, the global reach of the Hizmet movement, and the 2016 coup attempt. While figures like George Fidas supported Gülen’s immigration case, this reflects personal or academic endorsements rather than CIA operations. The absence of declassified evidence, combined with the political context of Erdoğan’s accusations, suggests the CIA link is speculative and unproven. Gülen’s activities were more aligned with educational and religious goals than intelligence work. Sources: • Wikipedia, “Fethullah Gülen” and “Gülen Movement,” October 2024. • Al Jazeera, “Fethullah Gulen: From Presidential Ally to Turkey’s Alleged Coup Mastermind,” October 21, 2024. • The Washington Post, “Fethullah Gulen, Muslim Cleric and Target of Turkey’s Erdogan, Dies at 83,” October 21, 2024. • WikiLeaks, U.S. Embassy Ankara cable, 2009 (no CIA link mentioned). • Court records from Gülen’s 2008 green card case, citing letters from George Fidas and others. Note: If you seek details on a specific aspect of these allegations (e.g., the Tahşiye case or 2016 coup), or if you want further analysis of primary sources, please clarify, and I can refine the response.