Editing Edward Lansdale

==Early Life and Education== 
Edward Geary Lansdale was born on February 6, 1908, in Detroit, Michigan, to Henry Lansdale, an automotive industry worker, and Marguerite Geary. Raised in a middle-class family, he grew up in Los Angeles, California, after his family moved there in 1913. Lansdale attended Los Angeles High School, where he developed an interest in writing and storytelling, editing the school newspaper. He enrolled at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) in 1926, studying journalism and English, but left in 1931 without graduating due to financial pressures during the Great Depression. His informal education continued through voracious reading and self-study, shaping his unconventional approach to military and intelligence work.
==Early Career and Military Service==
After leaving UCLA, Lansdale worked in advertising in San Francisco, joining the J. Walter Thompson agency, where he honed skills in persuasion and communication that later informed his psychological warfare tactics. In 1941, he married Helen Batcheller, a schoolteacher, with whom he had two sons, Edward and Peter. When World War II began, Lansdale joined the U.S. Army in 1942, commissioned as a second lieutenant due to his civilian experience. Assigned to the **Office of Strategic Services (OSS)**, the precursor to the CIA, he served in military intelligence, analyzing Japanese propaganda and conducting counterintelligence in the Pacific Theater. Promoted to major by 1945, Lansdale’s OSS work in San Francisco and the Philippines exposed him to guerrilla tactics and psychological operations, laying the foundation for his postwar career.
==Post-War Career and the Philippines==
(1945–1954)  After the war, Lansdale remained in the Philippines, transitioning to the newly formed U.S. Air Force in 1947 with the rank of major. Stationed in Manila, he advised the Philippine Army on counterinsurgency against the communist Hukbalahap (Huk) rebellion, a peasant uprising rooted in agrarian discontent. Lansdale’s innovative approach emphasized civic action, propaganda, and intelligence over brute force. He befriended **Ramon Magsaysay**, a charismatic congressman, and became his mentor, helping him rise to Secretary of Defense in 1950 and President in 1953. Lansdale’s strategies included psychological warfare (e.g., spreading rumors of supernatural threats to demoralize Huks), economic reforms to win peasant support, and rigged elections to ensure Magsaysay’s victory, as detailed in *In the Midst of Wars* (1972), his memoir. By 1954, the Huk rebellion was largely subdued, earning Lansdale a reputation as a counterinsurgency genius. His work, supported by the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination under [[Frank Wisner]], established him as a key figure in Cold War covert operations.

==Vietnam and Counterinsurgency==
(1954–1968)  In 1954, Lansdale was assigned to Saigon, Vietnam, as part of the Saigon Military Mission, a CIA-led effort to bolster South Vietnam against communist North Vietnam after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Promoted to lieutenant colonel, he advised Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, replicating his Philippine model. Lansdale’s team, including Lucien Conei and Rufus Phillips, orchestrated propaganda, civic programs, and paramilitary operations to stabilize Diem’s regime. He spread disinformation about Viet Minh atrocities, resettled northern Catholics to bolster Diem’s base, and trained the South Vietnamese Army in counterinsurgency. His efforts helped Diem consolidate power, notably during the 1955 Battle of Saigon against the Binh Xuyen crime syndicate, though Lansdale exaggerated his role in *In the Midst of Wars*.

Lansdale returned to Washington in 1957, joining the Pentagon as deputy director of the Office of Special Operations, advising on counterinsurgency. Promoted to brigadier general in 1960, he became a key figure in the Kennedy administration’s counterinsurgency push. In 1961, he returned to Vietnam as a senior advisor, advocating “hearts and minds” strategies to counter the Viet Cong. Lansdale proposed civic action and rural development, but his influence waned as U.S. policy shifted to conventional warfare under Robert McNamara. He clashed with military brass, who dismissed his unconventional tactics, and was sidelined after Diem’s 1963 assassination, which Lansdale opposed. From 1965 to 1968, he served as a civilian advisor in Vietnam, working on pacification programs like the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), but retired in 1968, frustrated by the war’s escalation.

==Connections to Related Topics==
- [[CIA]]: Lansdale was a CIA operative in the 1950s, working under [[Allen Dulles]] and Wisner on [[Operation PBSuccess]](1954 Guatemala coup) planning, though his primary role was in Asia. His Vietnam work aligned with CIA efforts, including Operation Mongoose (anti-Castro plots), but he had no documented role in [[Crypto AG]]’s Operation Rubicon, per the 2020 *Washington Post* report.

- [[School of the Americas]] (SOA) Lansdale’s counterinsurgency doctrines, taught at the SOA, influenced Latin American officers, including those in Condor nations, but he had no direct SOA involvement.

==Later Life and Legacy== 
After retiring, Lansdale settled in McLean, Virginia, writing *In the Midst of Wars*, which romanticized his career but drew criticism for inaccuracies, as noted by historian Edward Miller.  He lectured on counterinsurgency, consulted for the Nixon administration, and worked as a civilian analyst for the RAND Corporation. Lansdale’s health declined in the 1980s due to heart issues, and he died of a heart attack on February 23, 1987, in Alexandria, Virginia, at age 79. He was buried at **Arlington National Cemetery**, survived by Helen and their sons.

Lansdale’s legacy is complex. Celebrated as the “father of counterinsurgency,” his Philippine success inspired U.S. policy, earning him the **National Security Medal** (1960). However, his Vietnam failures, chronicled in *The Quiet American* by Graham Greene (a fictionalized Lansdale as Alden Pyle), highlighted the limits of his approach against determined insurgencies. His methods, blending propaganda, civic action, and covert operations, influenced modern counterinsurgency but were criticized for enabling authoritarian regimes, per *The Road Not Taken* by Max Boot.