Editing Condortel

Condortel was the secure communications network used by the member countries of [[Operation Condor]], a U.S.-backed campaign of political repression and state terror orchestrated by right-wing military dictatorships in South America during the 1970s and early 1980s. It was modeled after the [[CIA]] computer system used during the [[Phoenix Program]]. Operation Condor involved Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with Ecuador and Peru later participating, and aimed to eliminate activists, dissidents, and perceived subversives through intelligence sharing, abductions, torture, disappearances, and assassinations. Condortel was a critical component of this operation, enabling real-time coordination of intelligence and operations across borders. 
==What Was Condortel?==
Definition and Purpose: Condortel was a telecommunications system that facilitated encrypted, secure communication among the intelligence agencies of Condor member states. Its primary purpose was to enable the rapid exchange of intelligence on targeted individuals, coordinate cross-border operations, and maintain operational secrecy. It supported Condor’s mission to track, abduct, and eliminate dissidents, often referred to as “subversives,” across South America and beyond.

Operational Scope: Condortel was integral to Condor’s intelligence-sharing network, which included a computerized database storing information on thousands of suspected leftists, activists, and political opponents. This system allowed for the identification, surveillance, and apprehension of individuals, as seen in cases like the 1978 abduction of Argentine journalist Norberto Habegger in Brazil and the 1980 transfer of Mónica Pinus de Binstock to Argentina.

Historical Context: Established during Condor’s formalization in November 1975 at a meeting in Santiago, Chile, hosted by Chile’s DINA (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional), Condortel operated during the height of Condor’s activities (1975–1983). It was part of a broader effort to counter movements amid Cold War tensions, particularly after the Cuban Revolution (1959) and the rise of resistance to US involvement in Latin America.
==Structure and Functionality==
Physical Infrastructure: Condortel was based at a U.S. military facility in the Panama Canal Zone, a strategic hub for U.S. operations in Latin America. The system utilized advanced telecommunications equipment, including telex machines, encrypted radio transmissions, and early computer networks, to connect intelligence agencies like DINA (Chile), SIDE (Argentina), SNIE (Brazil), and Paraguay’s Department of Investigations.

Technical Support: The CIA provided significant technical assistance for Condortel, supplying computers and encryption technology to manage Condor’s database and communications. A 2000 CIA report, declassified via the National Security Archive, acknowledges the agency’s role in equipping Condor with “computers and software” for its intelligence network, with Condortel as the backbone.

[[Crypto AG]] Connection: The CIA and West Germany’s BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) secretly owned Crypto AG, a Swiss cryptography firm, which supplied rigged encryption machines to Condor countries, including Brazil, as revealed in a 2020 Washington Post report. These machines allowed the CIA to decrypt Condortel communications, giving the U.S. insight into Condor operations while maintaining plausible deniability. This indicates the CIA was aware of the efforts of Operation Condor's torture, murder and disappearing of persons opposed to US involvement in Latin America.

Operational Mechanism: Condortel enabled real-time coordination, such as relaying target locations or operation plans. For example, when dissidents fled across borders (e.g., Chileans to Argentina), Condortel allowed agencies to share intelligence instantly, facilitating abductions or assassinations. The system’s efficiency is evident in Condor’s ability to conduct Phase III operations, involving multinational death squads targeting exiles in Europe, as noted in a September 1976 CIA cable.

==Role in Operation Condor==
Intelligence Sharing: Condortel was the conduit for [[Operation Condor]]’s centralized database, which stored names, addresses, and affiliations of suspected dissidents. This database, managed by DINA and accessible via Condortel, was described by historian J. Patrice McSherry as a “computerized system of files” that enabled precise targeting, resulting in an estimated 60,000–80,000 deaths and 400,000 political prisoners.

Cross-Border Operations: Condortel facilitated seamless coordination for abductions and transfers. A notable case is the 1976 kidnapping of Chileans Jorge Fuentes and Amilcar Santucho in Paraguay, orchestrated via Condortel communications between Paraguayan and Chilean intelligence, with U.S. knowledge, as detailed in Paraguayan “Terror Archives” discovered in 1992.

Psychological Warfare and Propaganda: Condortel supported Condor’s “non-violent” activities, such as propaganda campaigns to discredit legitimate resistance movements, as noted in a June 1976 CIA report. These efforts complemented the Brazilian Advanced War College (ESG)’s emphasis on psychological operations.

European Operations: Condortel’s reach extended to Europe, where Condor targeted exiles like former Chilean minister [[Orlando Letelier]], assassinated in Washington, D.C., in September 1976. A CIA cable from September 1977 notes European intelligence agencies exploring Condor-like tactics, suggesting Condortel’s role in global coordination. The CIA was aware of the targeting of Letelier and the used of CIA trained Cuban Exiles to target him with a car bomb detonated in downtown Washington DC.

==Connections to the CIA==
The CIA’s involvement with Condortel was integral to Operation Condor’s success, reflecting U.S. Cold War priorities in Latin America:

Technical Assistance: The CIA supplied Condortel’s infrastructure, including computers and secure communication lines, as confirmed by a 2000 CIA report. Journalist A.J. Langguth (1978) states the CIA acted as an intermediary for Condor’s death squads, with Condortel facilitating these connections.

Crypto AG Oversight: The 2020 Washington Post report details how Crypto AG’s rigged machines, used by Condor nations, allowed the CIA to monitor Condortel traffic. This gave the U.S. real-time access to Condor’s plans, including assassinations.

Knowledge and Complicity: Declassified CIA cables, such as one from August 1976, show the agency was aware of Condor’s assassination plans, including Phase III operations in Europe and the United States. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, was briefed but canceled a warning to Condor nations, as revealed in 2010 declassified documents, indicating tacit approval.

Training and Coordination: The CIA’s influence extended through the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA), where Condor operatives, including Brazil’s SNIE officers, trained in counterinsurgency and interrogation. While Condortel was a technical tool, its users were shaped by CIA-backed programs, as noted in 1960s U.S. Army manuals found in Paraguayan archives.

Brazilian Context: Brazil’s SNIE (Serviço Nacional de Informações), established in 1964, used Condortel for Condor operations, such as the 1978 Habegger abduction. The CIA’s support for Brazil’s 1964 coup (Operation Brother Sam) and its provision of Condortel infrastructure aligned with Brazil’s anti-communist stance, though Brazil withdrew from active Condor participation by 1977, per a December 1977 CIA cable.

Connections to the Brazilian Advanced War College (ESG)
[[Advanced War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, Brazil)]], founded in 1949, trained Brazil’s military elite and developed the National Security Doctrine, which justified repressing “subversives” and aligned with Condor’s objectives. 

Ideological Alignment: The ESG’s doctrine, emphasizing internal security and hemispheric defense, mirrored Condor’s anti-communist goals. ESG graduates, such as presidents Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979) and João Figueiredo (1979–1985), oversaw Brazil’s Condor participation, including SNIE’s use of Condortel for intelligence sharing.

Training Overlap: Many ESG instructors and graduates attended the SOA, where CIA-backed counterinsurgency training included techniques used in Condor operations. The ESG’s curricula, influenced by U.S. advisors via the 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, likely incorporated communication and intelligence strategies compatible with Condortel’s framework, though no records confirm ESG training on Condortel specifically.

Regional Cooperation: The ESG promoted military coordination through forums like the [[Conference of American Armies (CAA)]], which fostered trust among Condor nations’ armies. While the CAA and ESG were not Condortel operators, their facilitation of military networks supported Condor’s infrastructure, including Condortel’s use by SNIE.
==Significance and Legacy==
Operational Efficiency: Condortel’s secure, U.S.-provided infrastructure enabled Condor’s multinational repression, making it a model for state-sponsored terror networks. Its use of [[Crypto AG]] machines ensured CIA oversight, as confirmed by the 2020 Washington Post report, highlighting the U.S.’s dual role as enabler and monitor.

Human Rights Impact: Condortel’s role in targeting dissidents contributed to Condor’s estimated 60,000–80,000 deaths, including high-profile cases like Letelier’s assassination. The Paraguayan “Terror Archives,” discovered in 1992, document Condortel’s use in abductions, underscoring its human cost.

Post-Condor Investigations: Condor trials, such as Argentina’s 2016 case convicting 15 officers, relied on declassified U.S. documents mentioning Condortel, but its technical details remain partially obscured due to CIA redactions. Brazil’s National Truth Commission (2014) investigated Condor but did not specifically address Condortel, reflecting limited access to SNIE records.

Modern Relevance: Condortel’s legacy informs discussions on state surveillance and encrypted communications, with parallels to modern NSA programs. The Crypto AG scandal, linked to Condortel, raised ethical questions about U.S. intelligence practices, as noted in The Guardian (2020).