Editing I&O (section)

==Connections to Operation Gladio ==
[[Operation Gladio]] was the codename for Italy’s stay-behind network, established in 1952 with CIA and NATO support, but the term is often used to describe similar networks across Western Europe, including I&O in the Netherlands. I&O was an integral part of this broader NATO-coordinated stay-behind framework, sharing goals, resources, and oversight mechanisms. 
===Key connections include===
	•	NATO Coordination: I&O was linked to [[NATO Clandestine Planning Committee]] (CPC) and [[Allied Clandestine Committee]] (ACC), established in 1951 and 1957, respectively. These bodies, involving representatives from the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Norway, and others, coordinated stay-behind activities. General Gerardo Serravalle, former Italian Gladio commander, noted that Dutch representatives attended annual CPC meetings, with CIA observers present but without voting rights.

	•	CIA and MI6 Involvement: I&O collaborated with MI6 from 1948 and the CIA from 1949, receiving funding, training, and equipment. In the early 1950s, I&O worked with the CIA and BID to drop agents behind the Iron Curtain, mirroring Gladio’s anti-communist operations. Former CIA director [[William Colby]] admitted to setting up similar networks in Scandinavia, indicating a broader Western intelligence strategy that included the Netherlands.

	•	Shared Objectives: Like Gladio, I&O aimed to resist Soviet invasion through guerrilla warfare and sabotage while countering communist influence domestically. A 1959 Italian SISMI document outlined Gladio’s dual goals—resisting invasion and conducting “operations” in “emergencies” (e.g., rising communist influence)—which aligned with I&O’s mandate to counter communist propaganda and monitor political developments.

	•	Tripartite Overleg: From 1951, I&O participated in the Tripartite Overleg with British and American intelligence, discussing stay-behind strategies. Unlike some Gladio branches, I&O was explicitly under Dutch government control, not NATO command, as emphasized by Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers in 1990.

	•	Weapons Caches and Scandals: Both I&O and Gladio maintained secret arms depots, leading to similar controversies. The 1980 and 1983 Dutch cache discoveries paralleled incidents in Italy and Belgium, prompting public scrutiny after Gladio’s exposure.

===Key Differences from Gladio ===
While I&O was part of the Gladio network, it differed in several ways:
	•	National Control: Lubbers stressed that I&O operated under Dutch government authority, not NATO or foreign oversight, unlike some Gladio branches that were more closely tied to NATO command.

	•	Limited Controversy: Unlike Italy’s Gladio, which was implicated in the 1972 Peteano bombing and the “strategy of tension,” no definitive evidence links I&O to terrorism or political violence in the Netherlands. Allegations of domestic overreach (e.g., monitoring communists) exist but lack the severity of Italian cases.

	•	Organizational Structure: I&O’s dual structure (Operatiën and Inlichtingen) was unique, with separate tasks and eventual coordination by a single figure (Max van der Stoel by 1992). Italian Gladio was more unified under SISMI.