Editing Hafizullah Amin (section)

==Presidency and Conflict with the Soviet Union==
On September 14, 1979, Amin orchestrated a coup against Taraki. Amin, known for his imperious demeanor, outmaneuvered Taraki, ousting him from office in September 1979. Weeks later, Taraki was killed in a hail of gunfire inside a Kabul compound, (Coll, 2004, p. 47). Williams (2015) notes that Afghan military officers, under Amin’s direction, executed the coup that installed him as president (p. 169).

Amin declared himself president, consolidating power but inheriting a nation on the brink of collapse. His “impeccable western credentials” and meetings with U.S. Embassy officials in Kabul raised suspicions in Moscow (Williams, 2015, p. 169). The KGB, believed that Amin was a CIA agent, after learning of his contacts with American diplomats (Coll, 2004, p. 47). A document circulating in India noted Amin’s affiliation with the CIA-linked Asia Foundation during his time in New York, fueling speculation that he might be an American plant infiltrating the Afghan Communist Party (Coll, 2004, p. 47 Ghost Wars, p. 47).

Amin sought to withdraw $400 million from Afghanistan’s foreign bank accounts, a move the KGB viewed as a bid for financial independence (Coll, 2004, p. 47). Reports also suggested he was exploring a compromise with Islamic rebels, a strategy the KGB had previously urged (Coll, 2004, p. 47). In November 1979, the KGB warned Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev of an “intended shift” in Afghan foreign policy toward the United States, citing Amin’s secretive meetings with the U.S. chargé d’affaires (Coll, 2004, p. 47). 

His nationalist rhetoric and allegations of his involvement in the death of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs earlier that year, further strained international relations. Amin’s refusal to be dictated by Moscow along with his estrangement with the United States led to increased destabilization.

Amin’s presidency was marked by escalating violence and repression. He announced that the DRA was not bound by old treaties with Iran regarding the Helmand River, signaling his independent streak. Internally, he faced growing opposition from both the Parcham faction, exiled in the Soviet Union, and the Mujahideen, backed by the CIA through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), grew stronger, receiving medical supplies, radios, and propaganda support authorized by President Jimmy Carter in July 1979 (Coll, 2004, p. 46). Williams (2015) details how the CIA funneled over $3 billion in “black aid” to rebels like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, escalating the conflict and boosting opium production to fund the war (p. 169). Cockburn (1998) notes that the ISI channeled 60% of U.S.-supplied arms to Hekmatyar, a fanatical fundamentalist, highlighting the fragmented nature of the Mujahideen (p. 263).

Fearing a U.S.-backed fundamentalist regime on its border, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 (Williams, 2015, p. 169). On December 27, Soviet Spetsnaz and KGB forces launched Operation Storm-333, storming the Tajbeg Palace where Amin had relocated for security. Earlier that day, a KGB agent posing as a cook poisoned Amin and his ministers, leaving him unconscious (Coll, 2004, p. 51). Soviet doctors revived him, unaware of the plot, but the assault followed swiftly. Overwhelmed by 660 Spetsnaz troops, Amin’s 2,200 defenders fell, and Amin was killed by gunfire. His 11-year-old son died from shrapnel, and other family members were killed or imprisoned (Coll, 2004, p. 51).

The Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, a Parchamite, as president, denouncing Amin as a U.S. spy and criminal. Amin’s body was buried in an unmarked grave at the Tajbeg Palace, never recovered (Coll, 2004, p. 51).

Hafizullah Amin’s brief rule, allegedly supported by the United States to destabilize Afghanistan while also funding the opposition left Afghanistan fractured and bleeding. His radical reforms and ruthless tactics alienated the population, fueling the Mujahideen insurgency that the CIA and Pakistan exploited (Williams, 2015, p. 169; Cockburn, 1998, p. 263). The Soviet invasion, provoked by his perceived disloyalty, plunged Afghanistan into a decade-long war, killing millions and destabilizing the region (Coll, 2004, p. 51). National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the invasion as a chance to bog down the Soviets, outlining a CIA-led campaign to arm the rebels and challenge Moscow across the Khyber Pass (Coll, 2004, p. 51). This strategy, as Williams (2015) argues, aimed to control Eurasia but unleashed chaos that persists today (p. 169). Brzezinski is on record as saying they planned this to give the Soviet Union their Vietnam.