Editing Reinhard Gehlen (section)

==Operation Gladio==
After surrendering to U.S. forces in 1945, Gehlen leveraged his wartime intelligence archives and expertise on the Soviet Union to establish the Gehlen Organization under U.S. Army and later CIA supervision. Based in Pullach, Germany, this organization focused on espionage against the Soviet bloc, employing many former Nazi intelligence operatives with networks across Eastern Europe. Operation Gladio, initiated in the late 1940s by NATO, the CIA, and European intelligence services, created secret paramilitary units to conduct sabotage and guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion. These units, particularly in countries like Italy, West Germany, and Belgium, were also implicated in anti-communist activities, including alleged false-flag operations to destabilize leftist movements.

Gehlen’s connection to Gladio primarily stems from the Gehlen Organization’s role as a central hub for anti-Soviet intelligence in Europe, which aligned with Gladio’s objectives. West Germany, as a frontline state in the Cold War, was a key Gladio operational base, and Gehlen’s network provided infrastructure, personnel, and intelligence that likely supported or overlapped with Gladio’s stay-behind units. 

	The Gehlen Organization employed numerous former Wehrmacht and SS officers with experience in covert operations, many of whom had anti-communist agendas aligning with Gladio’s goals. These operatives, with established contacts in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, were ideal for Gladio’s clandestine networks. While no declassified documents explicitly confirm Gehlen’s operatives as Gladio members, the overlap in personnel profiles suggests collaboration.

	As a CIA-funded entity, the Gehlen Organization operated within the broader U.S.-NATO intelligence framework that oversaw Gladio. Gehlen’s close ties to the CIA, particularly through figures like [[Allen Dulles]], positioned his organization to contribute to NATO’s covert strategies. Gladio’s coordination through NATO’s Clandestine Coordinating Committee likely involved West German intelligence, which Gehlen led after the BND’s formation in 1956.

	Gehlen’s organization conducted infiltration and sabotage operations in Eastern Europe, mirroring Gladio’s preparedness for guerrilla warfare. In West Germany, Gladio units maintained arms caches and trained operatives, activities that would have required coordination with Gehlen’s intelligence apparatus, given his dominance in West German espionage during the 1950s and 1960s.

	Some historians, such as Daniele Ganser in NATO’s Secret Armies, suggest that Gehlen’s network may have indirectly supported Gladio’s more controversial actions, such as the “strategy of tension” in Italy, where Gladio operatives were implicated in terrorist acts to discredit communists. Gehlen’s use of right-wing extremists and former Nazis parallels the composition of some Gladio units, though direct evidence tying him to specific Gladio operations, like the 1980 Bologna bombing, is absent.

Gehlen’s involvement in Gladio appears to have been strategic rather than operational. As head of the Gehlen Organization and later the BND, he likely facilitated Gladio’s activities by providing intelligence, logistical support, and access to his network of anti-communist operatives. His role as a liaison between U.S. intelligence and West German authorities would have made him a key figure in integrating Gladio into NATO’s broader Cold War strategy.

Gehlen’s reliance on former Nazis, some with war crime records, mirrors criticisms of Gladio’s recruitment of right-wing extremists, raising ethical questions about his contributions to NATO’s covert programs. His organization’s infiltration by Soviet agents, such as Heinz Felfe, also suggests vulnerabilities that could have compromised Gladio-related activities.