Editing Phoenix Program (section)

==Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs)==
===Assassination Teams===
The PRUs were elite, small-unit teams created by the CIA to conduct high-risk operations against the VCI, which included VC political cadres, tax collectors, recruiters, and other non-combatant supporters embedded in South Vietnamese villages. The goal was to “neutralize” these individuals through capture, defection, or elimination.

Each PRU typically consisted of 15–20 operatives, organized at the provincial level under the oversight of CIA advisors, South Vietnamese provincial authorities, and, later, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). By 1969, there were approximately 4,000 PRU operatives across South Vietnam’s 44 provinces.

Initially called “Counter Terror” teams, the name was changed to PRUs in 1967 to avoid negative connotations, but their mission remained focused on disrupting the VCI through aggressive, targeted actions.
===Recruits===
PRUs were primarily composed of South Vietnamese personnel, including former VC defectors (rallied through the Chieu Hoi amnesty program), ex-criminals, mercenaries, and ethnic minorities like Montagnards or Cambodians. The CIA valued defectors for their knowledge of VC tactics and networks, but this also raised concerns about loyalty and reliability.

Recruits were often motivated by financial incentives (PRUs were well-paid compared to regular South Vietnamese forces), personal vendettas against the VC, or coercion. Some operatives were criminals offered amnesty in exchange for service, which contributed to the units’ controversial reputation.

Each PRU was assigned a CIA advisor, typically a paramilitary officer or Special Forces operative under CIA direction, who provided training, intelligence, and operational guidance. Advisors reported to the CIA’s Saigon station or regional officers within the CORDS framework.
===Training and Equipping===
The CIA trained PRUs in counterinsurgency tactics, including reconnaissance, ambushes, interrogation techniques, and small-unit combat. Training emphasized stealth, intelligence collection, and rapid strikes, often conducted at night to maximize surprise.

PRUs were equipped with advanced U.S.-supplied gear, including M16 rifles, radios, and sometimes silenced weapons, which distinguished them from regular South Vietnamese forces. They also had access to vehicles and helicopters for mobility.

PRUs were taught CIA-developed interrogation methods, which ranged from psychological pressure to, in some cases, brutal techniques like waterboarding or beatings. These methods, often applied in provincial interrogation centers, fueled accusations of human rights abuses.
===Operations and Tactics===
PRUs conducted “snatch-and-grab” missions to capture VCI members for interrogation or defection, but killing was common when capture was not feasible. Operations were based on intelligence from informants, defectors, or District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCCs), which compiled lists of suspected VCI.

PRUs often operated under cover of darkness, raiding villages or safehouses identified as VCI hubs. These raids could involve killing suspects on the spot if they resisted or if capture was deemed too risky.

Critics, including Douglas Valentine in The Phoenix Program (1990), argue that PRUs functioned as de facto assassination teams, with orders to eliminate high-value VCI targets. Official reports confirm 26,369 VCI were killed between 1968 and 1972 (South Vietnamese estimates cite up to 41,000), with PRUs responsible for a significant portion. While CIA officials like [[William Colby]] claimed killings were a last resort, accounts from PRU operatives and Vietnamese sources suggest targeted assassinations were routine.

PRUs were designed to instill fear in the VC and their supporters, using tactics like leaving calling cards (e.g., the “Phung Hoang” logo, a mythical bird) at raid sites to signal their presence and deter collaboration with the VC.
===Examples of Operations===
Specific operations are less documented due to their covert nature, but Valentine’s interviews with PRU members describe missions where teams killed VCI leaders in their homes or ambushed VC tax collectors in rural areas. One notorious case involved PRUs in Quang Nam province, where they reportedly executed dozens of suspected VCI without trials.
===Scale and Effectiveness===
The Phoenix Program, driven by PRU operations, “neutralized” 81,740 VCI members from 1968 to 1972, with PRUs playing a key role in captures and killings. The CIA claimed this disrupted VC control over rural areas, forcing their infrastructure underground by 1972, a view echoed by some Vietnamese communist accounts.

The CIA imposed neutralization quotas (e.g., a certain number of VCI per province monthly), which pressured PRUs to produce results. This led to inflated body counts and the targeting of non-VCI civilians to meet quotas, undermining the program’s precision.