Editing Hafizullah Amin

Born on August 1, 1929 and died on December 27, 1979) was an Afghan politician, revolutionary, and teacher who briefly served as the president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) from September 14, 1979, until his assassination on December 27, 1979. 

As a key figure in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the leader of its Khalq faction, Amin played a pivotal role in the Saur Revolution of 1978, which established new leadership in Afghanistan. His short but tumultuous presidency, marked by brutal repression, internal party strife, and deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union, precipitated the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, setting the stage for decades of conflict. This biography draws from multiple sources to provide a comprehensive account of Amin’s life, political career, and enduring legacy.

Early Life and Education

Hafizullah Amin was born in Qazi Khel village, Paghman, near Kabul, Afghanistan, to a Kharoti Ghilzai Pashtun family. His father, an office worker, died early, and Amin was raised by his elder brother Abdullah, a primary school teacher who later became secretary to the president of a large cotton company. This familial support enabled Amin to access education, a privilege that shaped his future. He attended primary and secondary schools in Kabul, excelling academically, and graduated from the Darul Mualimeen Teachers College and the scientific faculty of Kabul University, where he studied mathematics.

In 1957, Amin traveled to the United States to pursue graduate studies at Columbia University in New York City, earning a master’s degree in education. During his time in the U.S., he was exposed to student movements, notably joining the Socialist Progressive Club at Columbia. He returned to Afghanistan briefly but went back to the U.S. in 1962 to work on a doctoral dissertation at the University of Wisconsin. His political activism, including his role as chairman of the Federation of Afghan Students, an organization funded by the Asia Foundation, a CIA front, which later fueled speculation about his ties to American intelligence (Williams, 2015, p. 169; Cockburn, 1998, p. 263). 

led to his expulsion from the U.S. before completing his doctorate, due to his outspoken anti-imperialist views.

Early Career and Political Involvement

Upon returning to Afghanistan, Amin embarked on a career in education, leveraging his credentials to influence young minds. He taught at Kabul University and served as vice-principal and later principal of the prestigious Avesina High School, as well as director of the Ibn Sina Kabul Lycee and the higher teachers’ college. During this period, he cultivated a reputation as a Pashtun nationalist, advocating for social reform and modernization.

Amin’s political engagement deepened in the early 1960s. He joined the Wikh-e Zalmayan (“Awakened Youth”), a reform-minded brotherhood, before becoming a member of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1963, an organization co-founded by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. The PDPA split into two factions in 1967: the Khalq (“Masses”), led by Taraki and Amin, and the Parcham (“Banner”), led by Karmal. Amin aligned with the Khalq faction, which emphasized policies and appealed to the working class and rural Pashtuns.

Amin’s political rise was marked by his organizational skills and charisma. In 1965, he ran for parliament but lost; however, in 1969, he became the only Khalqist elected to the lower house, using the platform to criticize the monarchy and advocate for class struggle against feudalism and imperialism. His fiery rhetoric and Pashtun nationalist stance earned him both supporters and detractors, with some within the PDPA accusing him of “fascist traits” for his uncompromising approach.

The Saur Revolution and Rise to Power

Amin’s prominence grew as the PDPA gained traction amid Afghanistan’s political instability. With Amin's ties to the CIA, he was suspected as playing a role when in 1973, Mohammad Daoud Khan overthrew the monarchy, establishing a republic, but his slow pace of reform alienated the PDPA. Amin, who had become a leading figure in the Khalq faction’s military wing, orchestrated the Saur Revolution on April 27, 1978, a coup that toppled Daoud’s government. The PDPA seized power, establishing the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, with Taraki as president and prime minister and Amin as deputy prime minister.

As a Khalqist strongman, Amin spearheaded efforts to purge the rival Parcham faction from government, sidelining figures like Karmal. The PDPA implemented sweeping reforms, including land redistribution and secularization, which alienated Afghanistan’s conservative, Islamic society and disrupted the opium production which was a cash cow for the CIA. These policies sparked widespread unrest, particularly among rural tribes and religious leaders, fueling the rise of Mujahideen resistance groups supported by the CIA. The Soviets advised Taraki to recruit mullahs and soften anti-Islamic policies (Coll, 2004, p. 46). Taraki sought Soviet troops to quell the rebels, but Moscow refused, wary of escalating tensions with the West (Cockburn, 1998, p. 263).


Amin’s power grew despite internal party tensions. On March 27, 1979, he assumed the role of prime minister, while Taraki retained the presidency. However, the country descended into chaos as protests against the regime’s reforms intensified, and the Afghan military weakened due to desertions, dropping from 100,000 to 50,000–70,000 personnel. Amin’s brutal methods, including mass executions and forced disappearances, earned him a fearsome reputation. Over 7,000 Hazaras and thousands of others were killed or vanished under his watch, deepening ethnic and social divides. 

Presidency and Conflict with the Soviet Union

On September 14, 1979, Amin orchestrated a coup against Taraki. Amin, known for his imperious demeanor, outmaneuvered Taraki, ousting him from office in September 1979. Weeks later, Taraki was killed in a hail of gunfire inside a Kabul compound, (Coll, 2004, p. 47). Williams (2015) notes that Afghan military officers, under Amin’s direction, executed the coup that installed him as president (p. 169).

 Amin declared himself president, consolidating power but inheriting a nation on the brink of collapse. His “impeccable western credentials” and meetings with U.S. Embassy officials in Kabul raised suspicions in Moscow (Williams, 2015, p. 169). The KGB, believed that Amin was a CIA agent, after learning of his contacts with American diplomats (Coll, 2004, p. 47). A document circulating in India noted Amin’s affiliation with the CIA-linked Asia Foundation during his time in New York, fueling speculation that he might be an American plant infiltrating the Afghan Communist Party (Coll, 2004, p. 47 Ghost Wars, p. 47).

Amin sought to withdraw $400 million from Afghanistan’s foreign bank accounts, a move the KGB viewed as a bid for financial independence (Coll, 2004, p. 47). Reports also suggested he was exploring a compromise with Islamic rebels, a strategy the KGB had previously urged (Coll, 2004, p. 47). In November 1979, the KGB warned Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev of an “intended shift” in Afghan foreign policy toward the United States, citing Amin’s secretive meetings with the U.S. chargé d’affaires (Coll, 2004, p. 47). 

His nationalist rhetoric and allegations of his involvement in the death of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs earlier that year, further strained international relations. Amin’s refusal to be dictated by Moscow along with his estrangement with the United States led to increased destabilization.

Amin’s presidency was marked by escalating violence and repression. He announced that the DRA was not bound by old treaties with Iran regarding the Helmand River, signaling his independent streak. Internally, he faced growing opposition from both the Parcham faction, exiled in the Soviet Union, and the Mujahideen, backed by the CIA through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), grew stronger, receiving medical supplies, radios, and propaganda support authorized by President Jimmy Carter in July 1979 (Coll, 2004, p. 46). Williams (2015) details how the CIA funneled over $3 billion in “black aid” to rebels like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, escalating the conflict and boosting opium production to fund the war (p. 169). Cockburn (1998) notes that the ISI channeled 60% of U.S.-supplied arms to Hekmatyar, a fanatical fundamentalist, highlighting the fragmented nature of the Mujahideen (p. 263).

Fearing a U.S.-backed fundamentalist regime on its border, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 (Williams, 2015, p. 169). On December 27, Soviet Spetsnaz and KGB forces launched Operation Storm-333, storming the Tajbeg Palace where Amin had relocated for security. Earlier that day, a KGB agent posing as a cook poisoned Amin and his ministers, leaving him unconscious (Coll, 2004, p. 51). Soviet doctors revived him, unaware of the plot, but the assault followed swiftly. Overwhelmed by 660 Spetsnaz troops, Amin’s 2,200 defenders fell, and Amin was killed by gunfire. His 11-year-old son died from shrapnel, and other family members were killed or imprisoned (Coll, 2004, p. 51).

The Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, a Parchamite, as president, denouncing Amin as a U.S. spy and criminal. Amin’s body was buried in an unmarked grave at the Tajbeg Palace, never recovered (Coll, 2004, p. 51).

Hafizullah Amin’s brief rule, allegedly supported by the United States to destabilize Afghanistan while also funding the opposition left Afghanistan fractured and bleeding. His radical reforms and ruthless tactics alienated the population, fueling the Mujahideen insurgency that the CIA and Pakistan exploited (Williams, 2015, p. 169; Cockburn, 1998, p. 263). The Soviet invasion, provoked by his perceived disloyalty, plunged Afghanistan into a decade-long war, killing millions and destabilizing the region (Coll, 2004, p. 51). National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the invasion as a chance to bog down the Soviets, outlining a CIA-led campaign to arm the rebels and challenge Moscow across the Khyber Pass (Coll, 2004, p. 51). This strategy, as Williams (2015) argues, aimed to control Eurasia but unleashed chaos that persists today (p. 169). Brzezinski is on record as saying they planned this to give the Soviet Union their Vietnam.


Sources:

Williams, Paul L. (2015). Operation Gladio: The Unholy Alliance between the Vatican, the CIA, and the Mafia. Prometheus Books.

Cockburn, Alexander (1998). Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press. Verso.

Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars. Penguin Group (USA) Inc.