Editing JM/WAVE

Historical Summary of JM/WAVE
JM/WAVE was the codename for the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) covert operations station based in Miami, Florida, from 1961 to 1968, primarily focused on undermining and overthrowing Fidel Castro’s communist regime in Cuba. Operating out of the University of Miami’s South Campus, JM/WAVE was the largest CIA station outside Langley, Virginia, at its peak, orchestrating the Bay of Pigs invasion, Operation Mongoose, and numerous sabotage, propaganda, and assassination efforts. Below is a historical summary of JM/WAVE’s establishment, operations, key figures, and legacy, with references to CIA figures like Thomas G. Clines, Theodore Shackley, Edwin P. Wilson, and connections to Nugan Hand Bank, Michael Jon Hand, Augusto Pinochet, Mohammad Mossadegh, Milton Friedman, and Operation Pine Gap, as relevant to your previous queries.

Establishment (1961)
JM/WAVE was established in early 1961, following Fidel Castro’s consolidation of power after the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the U.S. government’s decision to counter his regime. Authorized by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and expanded under John F. Kennedy, the station was created to centralize anti-Castro operations in response to Cuba’s alignment with the Soviet Union.
	•	Location and Cover: JM/WAVE operated from a former naval air station at the University of Miami’s South Campus, leased by the CIA under the cover of Zenith Technical Enterprises, a fictitious company. The 1,571-acre site, surrounded by palmetto scrub, provided secrecy and space for training, communications, and logistics.
	•	Purpose: The station aimed to destabilize Castro’s government through covert means, including paramilitary actions, sabotage, propaganda, and intelligence-gathering, as part of a broader U.S. strategy to prevent communist expansion in the Western Hemisphere.

Key Operations (1961–1968)
JM/WAVE’s activities were multifaceted, encompassing some of the CIA’s most ambitious and controversial covert operations during the Cold War.
	1	Bay of Pigs Invasion (April 1961):
	◦	JM/WAVE’s first major operation was the Bay of Pigs invasion, a failed attempt to overthrow Castro using 1,400 Cuban exiles (Brigade 2506) trained by the CIA in Guatemala and Nicaragua. Launched on April 17, 1961, the invasion at Playa Girón was poorly planned, lacking adequate air support and U.S. military backing, as President Kennedy withheld direct intervention.
	◦	The operation, coordinated by JM/WAVE under station chief Theodore Shackley (1962–1965, though earlier led by others like William K. Harvey), was a humiliating defeat, with 114 exiles killed and 1,189 captured. The failure damaged the CIA’s reputation and strained U.S.-Cuba relations.
	◦	Thomas G. Clines, a key JM/WAVE operative, was involved in training exiles and logistics, working alongside Shackley and David Atlee Phillips, the station’s propaganda chief.
	2	Operation Mongoose (1961–1963):
	◦	Following the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy administration launched Operation Mongoose, a covert program to destabilize Castro through sabotage, economic disruption, and assassination plots. JM/WAVE was the operational hub, executing raids on Cuban infrastructure, infiltrating agents, and spreading anti-Castro propaganda.
	◦	The operation, overseen by Robert F. Kennedy and CIA officer Edward Lansdale, involved over 400 CIA officers and 2,000 Cuban exiles at JM/WAVE, with a budget of $50 million annually. Notable actions included blowing up Cuban factories, sinking ships, and plotting to assassinate Castro using methods like poisoned cigars and exploding seashells.
	◦	Edwin P. Wilson, though not a core JM/WAVE figure, supplied arms and equipment through his front companies (e.g., Maritime Consulting Associates) to support such operations, reflecting his broader CIA logistics role.
	3	Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962):
	◦	JM/WAVE played a critical role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, providing intelligence on Soviet missile installations in Cuba through U-2 spy plane data and agent reports. The crisis, resolved through U.S.-Soviet negotiations, curtailed JM/WAVE’s aggressive operations, as Kennedy shifted toward diplomacy.
	◦	The station’s intelligence-gathering, led by Shackley and Clines, informed U.S. strategy, though its paramilitary plans were paused during the standoff.
	4	Post-Mongoose Activities (1963–1968):
	◦	After Mongoose was scaled back following Kennedy’s assassination (1963), JM/WAVE continued smaller-scale operations, including infiltration missions, radio propaganda via Radio Swan, and support for exile groups like Alpha 66 and Comandos Mambises. These efforts aimed to harass Castro’s regime but achieved limited success.
	◦	The station also monitored Cuban support for Latin American guerrilla movements, providing SIGINT and HUMINT to counter Soviet influence in the region.

Structure and Personnel
JM/WAVE was a sprawling operation, unprecedented in CIA history for its size and scope:
	•	Scale: At its peak (1962–1963), JM/WAVE employed over 400 CIA officers, 2,000 Cuban exile agents, and hundreds of support staff, operating 55 dummy corporations, a fleet of boats, aircraft (including C-47s and speedboats), and a radio station. It had a $100 million annual budget, equivalent to billions today.
	•	Key Figures:
	◦	Theodore Shackley: Station chief (1962–1965), known as the “Blond Ghost,” Shackley coordinated JM/WAVE’s operations, earning a reputation for meticulous planning. His team included Clines and Phillips.
	◦	Thomas G. Clines: A senior operative, Clines managed logistics, training, and exile operations, working closely with Shackley. His later roles in EATSCO and Iran-Contra reflect JM/WAVE’s influence on his career.
	◦	David Atlee Phillips: Head of propaganda, Phillips ran Radio Swan and psychological warfare, shaping anti-Castro narratives.
	◦	Edwin P. Wilson: While not stationed at JM/WAVE, Wilson’s front companies supplied arms and equipment, supporting its logistics. His ties to Shackley and Clines later connected him to Nugan Hand Bank and EATSCO.
	•	Cuban Exiles: JM/WAVE relied on exiles like Manuel Artime, Rolando Cubela, and Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, who conducted raids and intelligence missions, often with mixed results due to internal rivalries.

Connections to Queried Figures and Entities
	1	Augusto Pinochet and Salvador Allende:
	◦	JM/WAVE’s anti-communist operations in Cuba set a precedent for CIA interventions in Latin America, including the 1973 Chilean coup against Salvador Allende, led by Pinochet. Shackley and Clines, JM/WAVE veterans, directed anti-Allende efforts as heads of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division, using similar tactics (propaganda, funding opposition). Wilson’s arms supplies to Latin America may have supported anti-communist factions in Chile, though not directly tied to JM/WAVE.
	2	Mohammad Mossadegh:
	◦	The 1953 coup against Iran’s Mohammad Mossadegh (Operation Ajax) predated JM/WAVE but established the CIA’s playbook for overthrowing leftist governments, which JM/WAVE applied in Cuba. Shackley and Clines were not involved in Ajax, but their JM/WAVE experience informed later interventions.
	3	Milton Friedman:
	◦	Friedman had no direct link to JM/WAVE, but his neoliberal policies, implemented by the “Chicago Boys” in Pinochet’s Chile, aligned with U.S. anti-communist goals post-Allende, which JM/WAVE’s leadership (Shackley, Clines) supported through CIA operations. Friedman’s economic advising complemented the CIA’s geopolitical strategy.
	4	Nugan Hand Bank and Michael Jon Hand:
	◦	Nugan Hand Bank, co-founded by Michael Jon Hand, financed anti-communist operations, including Edwin P. Wilson’s 1974 arms deal to southern Africa. Hand’s CIA work in Laos under Shackley overlapped with JM/WAVE’s timeline, and Wilson’s logistics role tied him to Shackley and Clines. While JM/WAVE itself had no direct connection to Nugan Hand, the shared CIA network (Shackley, Clines, Wilson) suggests continuity in covert operations.
	5	Operation Pine Gap:
	◦	Operation Pine Gap, the U.S.-Australian SIGINT base, supported CIA operations in Southeast Asia and Latin America during JM/WAVE’s era. Pine Gap’s intelligence on communist activities likely aided JM/WAVE’s monitoring of Cuban-Soviet ties, though no declassified records confirm direct coordination. Shackley’s later role in the CIA’s Directorate for Science and Technology, overseeing SIGINT, suggests he influenced Pine Gap’s priorities.

Closure and Legacy (1968)
JM/WAVE was officially closed in 1968, as the U.S. shifted focus from Cuba to Vietnam and domestic priorities under President Lyndon B. Johnson. The station’s infrastructure was dismantled, and personnel, including Shackley and Clines, were reassigned to Southeast Asia or other operations.
	•	Reasons for Closure:
	◦	Diminishing returns from anti-Castro operations, with Castro’s regime entrenched and U.S. attention diverted to Vietnam.
	◦	Budget constraints and political backlash from the Bay of Pigs and Mongoose failures.
	◦	Improved U.S.-Soviet relations post-Cuban Missile Crisis, reducing the urgency of covert actions in Cuba.
	•	Legacy:
	◦	Operational Impact: JM/WAVE was a high-water mark for CIA covert operations, demonstrating the agency’s capacity for large-scale paramilitary and propaganda campaigns, but also its vulnerabilities, as seen in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. It trained a generation of CIA officers, including Shackley and Clines, who shaped later operations in Laos, Chile, and Iran-Contra.
	◦	Geopolitical Influence: The station’s anti-communist mission influenced CIA interventions elsewhere, such as the 1973 Chilean coup, where JM/WAVE alumni played key roles. Its logistics model, using front companies like Wilson’s, persisted in ventures like EATSCO.
	◦	Controversies: JM/WAVE’s assassination plots and exile operations raised ethical questions, scrutinized during the 1975 Church Committee hearings. Its legacy is documented in declassified CIA records, books like David Corn’s Blond Ghost, and The Cuba Project by Peter Kornbluh.

Conclusion
JM/WAVE was the CIA’s largest covert station, operating from 1961 to 1968 in Miami to overthrow Fidel Castro through the Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, and other anti-Castro efforts. Led by Theodore Shackley, with Thomas G. Clines and Edwin P. Wilson in supporting roles, it exemplified Cold War covert warfare but failed to topple Castro. Its influence extended to later CIA operations, including Chile’s 1973 coup, linked to Pinochet, and shared networks with Nugan Hand Bank and Michael Jon Hand. JM/WAVE’s legacy, marked by ambition and controversy, remains a pivotal chapter in CIA history.
If you’d like further details on specific JM/WAVE operations, its personnel, or connections to other CIA activities, please let me know!