Editing Projekt-26

==Overview of Projekt-26 (P-26)==
Projekt-26, commonly known as P-26, was Switzerland’s clandestine “stay-behind” organization, active from the late 1940s until its dissolution in 1990. Established in the context of the Cold War, P-26 was designed to counter a potential Soviet invasion or occupation by organizing covert resistance, sabotage, and intelligence-gathering operations. Operating under strict secrecy, P-26 was embedded within Switzerland’s military intelligence services but functioned autonomously, outside parliamentary and governmental oversight. Its existence was revealed in 1990, following the exposure of Italy’s Operation Gladio, prompting significant controversy due to Switzerland’s official neutrality and the organization’s lack of democratic accountability.
==Structure and Operations==
	•	Formation: P-26 was established around 1948–1949, inspired by Switzerland’s WWII resistance planning and the broader Western stay-behind model initiated by the Western Union and later NATO. It was housed within the Untergruppe Nachrichtendienst und Abwehr (UNA), the Swiss military intelligence service, and led by figures like Efrem Cattelan, a civilian known to British intelligence. 

	•	Membership and Training: P-26 had approximately 400 members, primarily experts in weapons, telecommunications, and psychological warfare. Recruits, often civilians or military personnel, were trained in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and covert communications. Training occurred in Switzerland and abroad, notably in the UK, where P-26 operatives worked with MI6 and possibly SAS advisors. Swiss instructor Alois Hürlimann claimed participation in a UK training exercise involving an assault on an IRA arms depot, resulting in at least one death, though this remains unverified. 

	•	Arms Caches and Equipment: P-26 maintained a network of underground installations and weapons caches across Switzerland, stocked with explosives, machine guns, and specialized firearms like the Präzisionsgewehr G150, a .41 Magnum silent rifle. The group used Harpoon radios, a NATO-supplied encrypted communication system purchased from AEG Telefunken in the 1980s, enabling long-range (6,000 km) secure communications incompatible with standard Swiss military systems. 

	•	Mandate and Secrecy: P-26’s primary mission was to resist Soviet occupation, but it also had a controversial mandate to counter “domestic subversion,” potentially targeting left-wing groups if they gained political power. Its operations were so secretive that even the Swiss government and parliament were unaware, with command vested in a private citizen who could activate the force independently. 

	•	Key Incidents: P-26’s existence surfaced during the 1989 Fichenaffäre (secret files scandal), when it was revealed that Swiss security services had monitored 900,000 citizens, prompting a parliamentary probe. In 1990, Colonel Herbert Alboth, a former P-26 commander, offered to reveal “the whole truth” in a confidential letter, escalating scrutiny. 
Connections to Operation Gladio Operation Gladio, the codename for Italy’s stay-behind network, is often used to describe NATO’s broader clandestine anti-communist networks across Western Europe. While P-26 was not formally part of NATO’s stay-behind structure due to Switzerland’s neutrality, it had significant connections to Gladio and its supporting intelligence networks, particularly through MI6 and, to a lesser extent, the CIA.
==Key connections==
	•	Revelation and Timing: P-26’s exposure in November 1990 followed Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti’s October 1990 disclosure of Gladio, which revealed a NATO-coordinated stay-behind network across Europe. The timing prompted Switzerland to form a parliamentary commission, one of only three countries (with Italy and Belgium) to investigate such networks, to probe P-26’s links to Gladio. 

	•	MI6 Collaboration: The 1991 Cornu Report, authored by Swiss magistrate Pierre Cornu, described P-26’s collaboration with British intelligence as “intense.” Unknown to the Swiss government, MI6 signed agreements with P-26 (as late as 1987) for training in combat, communications, and sabotage. P-26 operatives regularly trained in the UK, and British advisors, possibly SAS, visited Swiss training sites. This mirrors Gladio’s training patterns, as Italian operatives also trained in the UK. 

	•	Harpoon Radios: P-26’s use of Harpoon radios, also employed by Belgium’s Gladio branch, suggests shared NATO infrastructure. Cornu found that P-26 connected foreign Harpoon stations in 1987 for 15 million Swiss francs, indicating coordination with other stay-behind networks. 

	•	Italian Evidence: Italian magistrate Felice Casson, who uncovered Gladio, claimed to have seen documents at SISMI’s Rome headquarters indicating Gladio contacts with Switzerland, though specifics remain unconfirmed. 

	•	NATO and CIA Ties: While P-26 was not directly under [[NATO Clandestine Planning Committee]] (CPC) or [[Allied Clandestine Committee]] (ACC), unlike Gladio branches in NATO countries, historian Daniele Ganser notes “close contact” with MI6, which collaborated with the CIA on Gladio operations. A 1990 Reuters report suggested CIA funding for stay-behind networks in neutral countries like Switzerland.

	•	Shared Objectives: Like Gladio, P-26 aimed to resist Soviet invasion but also monitored domestic left-wing movements. The Cornu Report criticized P-26’s mandate to act against a leftist parliamentary majority, echoing Gladio’s anti-communist activities in Italy, where it was linked to the “strategy of tension”.

==Controversies and Ethical Issues==
	•	Breach of Neutrality: P-26’s ties to MI6 and potential NATO connections raised concerns about violating Switzerland’s neutrality, a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Coordination with SHAPE or SACEUR (NATO’s European commander) would have been particularly contentious, though the Cornu Report’s redacted sections obscure definitive evidence. 

	•	Lack of Oversight: P-26 operated “outside political or legal legitimacy,” as per the Cornu Report, with no parliamentary or governmental control. This autonomy, also characteristic of Gladio, fueled public outrage, leading to Defense Minister Kaspar Villiger’s resignation in 1990.
 
	•	Domestic Subversion: The mandate to counter left-wing political gains, as noted by parliamentarian Carlo Schmid, suggested P-26 could undermine Swiss democracy, paralleling Gladio’s alleged role in Italy’s political violence. However, no evidence links P-26 to terrorism or assassinations, unlike Italian Gladio. 

	•	Cornu Report Secrecy: The 100-page Cornu Report, released in truncated form in 2018, remains partially classified until 2048. A 1991 summary claimed P-26 was “not part of an international network,” but redactions, especially on CIA/MI6 ties, limit transparency. In 2018, 27 related files were reported missing from Swiss archives, deepening suspicion. 

	•	Fichenaffäre Fallout: The 1989 secret files scandal, revealing surveillance of nearly one-seventh of Switzerland’s population, contextualized P-26’s exposure. The parliamentary probe into P-26, triggered by this scandal, shocked figures like Schmid, who described a “conspirational atmosphere.” 

==Dissolution and Legacy ==
On November 21, 1990, Swiss authorities dissolved P-26, citing its lack of oversight and questionable legitimacy. The decision followed a parliamentary commission’s findings and public outcry over the Fichenaffäre. A permanent exhibition on P-26, opened in 2017 at the Musée Résistance Suisse in Gstaad (a former P-26 bunker), was declared classified until 2041, accessible only to former members and secret service personnel, underscoring ongoing secrecy.

==Critical Assessment==
 P-26 was a Swiss adaptation of the stay-behind model, tailored to its neutral status but closely aligned with Western intelligence, particularly MI6. While not formally part of NATO’s Gladio network, its training, equipment, and anti-communist objectives reflect significant overlap. The absence of evidence tying P-26 to violence, unlike Italian Gladio’s alleged role in terrorism, suggests a more restrained scope, but its secrecy and domestic mandate remain troubling. Missing files and redacted reports hinder full understanding, leaving P-26 a contentious chapter in Swiss history, balancing Cold War pragmatism with breaches of democratic and neutral principles.