Editing Vito Genovese

Vito Genovese (November 21, 1897 – February 14, 1969), a notorious Italian-American mobster and boss of the Genovese crime family, is primarily known for his extensive criminal activities, including racketeering, drug trafficking, and murder. While Genovese’s criminal career is well-documented, claims about his involvement with U.S. military intelligence, particularly during World War II, are less well known. He spent time in Italy during the war and he interacted with U.S. authorities as a linguist during the Allies' Italian campaign. 

Background 

Genovese was born in Risigliano, Tufino, Italy, he immigrated to New York City as a teenager, rising through the ranks of organized crime under Charles “Lucky” Luciano. By the 1930s, he was a key figure in the Luciano (later Genovese) crime family, involved in bootlegging, extortion, and gambling. In 1937, facing a murder indictment in the 1934 killing of Ferdinand Boccia, Genovese fled to Italy, where he remained until 1945. His time in Italy, during the Fascist regime of Benito Mussolini and the Allied invasion, is the primary period associated with alleged military intelligence activities.

Military Intelligence Role During WWII

Genovese’s involvement with U.S. military intelligence center on his activities in Italy from 1937 to 1945, particularly after the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 (Operation Husky). 

Key points include:

Connections with U.S. Authorities in Italy  
During World War II, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, precursor to the CIA) sought to leverage Italian-American mobsters to gather intelligence and secure cooperation in Sicily and mainland Italy. The “Operation Underworld” initiative, led by ONI, involved figures like Luciano, who, from prison, facilitated contacts with Sicilian Mafia leaders to aid the Allied invasion. Genovese, living in Nola, near Naples, and well-connected in Fascist Italy, played a similar role.

Genovese acted as an interpreter and liaison for the Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories (AMGOT) in Naples after its liberation in October 1943. His fluency in Italian and English, combined with his criminal network, made him valuable to U.S. forces seeking to stabilize the region and counter black-market activities. A 1944 report by U.S. Army investigator Orange C. Dickey alleged Genovese was involved in black-market operations but also worked closely with AMGOT officials, possibly providing intelligence on local power structures or Fascist remnants. Instead of countering the black market, he commandeered it.

The Dickey Report, cited in works like The Luciano Project by Rodney Campbell (1977), notes Genovese’s role as an interpreter for AMGOT and his suspicious wealth, including a suitcase of cash and a villa in Nola. It accuses him of black-market profiteering (e.g., diverting flour and sugar), and in doing so was able to gather intelligence. Genovese’s 1944 arrest by the U.S. Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for black-market activities suggests he exploited his AMGOT connections.

Collaboration with Charles Poletti and the OSS 
 
Charles Poletti, a former New York lieutenant governor and AMGOT regional commissioner in Naples, oversaw post-occupation governance. Some accounts claim Genovese worked under Poletti, leveraging his Mafia ties to provide information on Italian officials and criminal networks. Authors like Tim Newark (Mafia Allies, 2007) suggest Genovese’s cooperation with Poletti and OSS operatives included sharing intelligence on Fascist loyalists and Sicilian Mafia figures, aiding U.S. efforts to secure southern Italy. His alleged friendship with Carmine Galante, another mobster in Italy, and meetings with Max Corvo, an OSS officer, are cited as evidence of OSS coordination.

Poletti’s documented reliance on local figures, including mobsters, to restore order lends plausibility. His lavish lifestyle and black-market dealings, detailed in CID reports, indicate he was profiting off of his arrangements.

Support for Mussolini and Fascist Ties  

Before the Allied invasion, Genovese cultivated ties with Mussolini’s regime, donating 2 million lire (equivalent to $100,000 in 1940s dollars) to Fascist causes and befriending Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law and foreign minister. He also ran a construction company in Nola, allegedly to curry favor with Fascist officials. Gangsters and Goodfellas by Henry Hill and Gus Russo (2004), speculate that Genovese provided U.S. intelligence with insights into Fascist operations, leveraging his high-level contacts. His 1943 murder of Carlo Tresca, an anti-Fascist Italian-American journalist in New York, allegedly ordered by Genovese from Italy, is cited as evidence of his dual role—serving Fascists while positioning himself for Allied cooperation.

The Tresca murder, attributed to Galante under Genovese’s orders, is documented in FBI files. Genovese’s Fascist donations were reported by The New York Times in 1945. 

Return to the U.S. and Post-War Implications  

In August 1944, Genovese was arrested by CID for black-market activities and returned to New York in June 1945 to face the 1934 Boccia murder charge. The case collapsed when key witness Peter LaTempa died in custody (poisoned) in January 1945, allowing Genovese’s release. Some sources, like Five Families by Selwyn Raab (2005), suggest U.S. authorities facilitated Genovese’s return to protect his intelligence contributions or due to mob influence within AMGOT. His rapid release raises questions.

The Dickey Report and FBI files confirm Genovese’s arrest and extradition and attributes his release to witness tampering.

In Paul Williams' book he reveals the following regarding Vito Genovese:

The book positions Genovese as a central figure in the international heroin trade, which Williams claims was a funding mechanism for Gladio’s clandestine operations. This aligns with Genovese’s documented role in the 1940s–1950s, when he expanded the Luciano family’s narcotics trafficking, particularly after Luciano’s 1946 deportation to Italy. Williams suggests that Genovese’s heroin network, established post-WWII, was facilitated by CIA and Vatican connections, with profits supporting anti-communist paramilitary efforts. The book cites the influx of heroin to Harlem in November 1947 as a milestone, linking it to Gladio’s financial operations.

Evidence Cited: Williams references the sale of “large stocks of SS morphine smuggled out of Germany and Italy” and “bogus British bank notes” produced in concentration camps as initial funding for Gladio, implying Genovese’s involvement in distributing these drugs. 

Involvement in 1948 Italian Election  

Williams details the CIA’s efforts to prevent a communist victory in Italy’s 1948 national election, alleging that $65 million in “black money” was funneled through the Vatican Bank to fund anti-communist activities, including mob violence. The book specifically mentions Giovanni Genovese, identified as “Vito Genovese’s cousin,” as part of a mob-led campaign orchestrated by Sicilian capo Don Calogero Vizzini (“Don Calo”). This campaign involved burning down 11 communist branch offices and attempting four assassinations of communist leader Girolamo Li Causi. Williams indicates that Vito Genovese’s had involvement in this effort, given his prominence in the Luciano family and ties to Sicilian Mafia figures like Vizzini, who collaborated with the CIA during Operation Husky (1943 Sicily invasion). 

Broader Mafia-CIA-Vatican Connections
  
Williams portrays Genovese as part of a syndicate network that included Luciano, Michele Sindona (a Vatican-linked banker), and Licio Gelli (P2 lodge grandmaster), all tied to Gladio’s anti-communist operations. The book references Genovese in connection to the Genovese crime family, noting its role in heroin trafficking and financial schemes supporting Gladio. Specific pages (e.g., 38–39, 49, 60, 80–81) discuss Genovese’s activities, likely detailing his post-war drug operations and syndicate leadership after Luciano’s deportation. Williams indicates that Genovese’s criminal enterprises, particularly narcotics, were intertwined with CIA-backed efforts to fund stay-behind units.

The Vatican Bank’s role in laundering funds, as cited by Williams, is supported by later scandals (e.g., Banco Ambrosiano, 1982), and the CIA’s funding of anti-communist groups in 1948 Italy is documented in declassified records (e.g., National Security Archive). Genovese’s cousin Giovanni’s alleged actions fit this pattern.