Editing Operation Condor

==Operation Condor==
Operation Condor (Operación Cóndor) was a U.S.-backed campaign of state terrorism and political repression orchestrated by South American military dictatorships from 1975 to 1983, primarily involving Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Aimed at eliminating left-wing activists, dissidents, and perceived communist threats during the Cold War, it resulted in an estimated 60,000–80,000 deaths, 400,000 detentions, and widespread torture. Formally launched on November 25, 1975, in Santiago, Chile, under Chile’s DINA intelligence chief Manuel Contreras, Condor facilitated cross-border assassinations, kidnappings, and intelligence sharing, with CIA support through funding, training, and communication systems. Key operations included the 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C., and Argentina’s “Dirty War” disappearances.

==Operation Gladio:==
Operation Condor shared significant ideological and operational ties with [[Operation Gladio]], NATO’s clandestine “stay-behind” network established in the 1950s to counter Soviet invasions in Europe, particularly in Italy, where it supported the “strategy of tension” to thwart the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Both operations were anti-communist, CIA-backed initiatives to suppress leftist movements, with overlapping networks and personnel. Key connections include:

	1	Shared Anti-Communist Agenda and CIA Support:
	◦	Gladio, initiated in Italy in 1956 with CIA funding, trained operatives and stockpiled arms for guerrilla resistance but was repurposed to orchestrate terrorist attacks like the Piazza Fontana bombing (1969) to destabilize Italy. Similarly, Condor targeted leftists to secure U.S. geopolitical interests in South America. The CIA, under figures like Allen Dulles, provided financial and logistical support to both, including encrypted communication systems for Condor and arms caches for Gladio.

	2	[[Propaganda Due P2]] as a Linking Hub:
	◦	The Propaganda Due (P2) Masonic lodge, led by [[Licio Gelli]], was central to Gladio’s Italian operations, coordinating neo-fascist attacks and laundering funds through Banco Ambrosiano’s [[Roberto Calvi]].  P2’s influence extended to South America, particularly Argentina, where members like Admiral Emilio Massera (Argentine junta, 1976–1978) and General Guillermo Suárez Mason were key Condor operatives. Gelli, with ties to Argentine dictator Juan Perón and the Triple A death squad, facilitated Condor’s repression, channeling Gladio-linked funds and strategies to South American juntas.

	3	Neo-Fascist and Intelligence Collaboration:
	◦	Gladio collaborated with Italian neo-fascist groups like Ordine Nuovo, led by operatives such as Stefano Delle Chiaie, who were implicated in Condor operations. Delle Chiaie, active in Argentina and Bolivia, trained Condor death squads and participated in coups, bridging Gladio’s “strategy of tension” with Condor’s cross-border assassinations. Italian intelligence (SID), infiltrated by P2, shared techniques with DINA, including torture methods learned from CIA training at the School of the Americas.

	4	Operational Overlaps:
	◦	Both operations pursued exiles internationally. Gladio operatives tracked Italian leftists in Europe, while Condor targeted South American dissidents in Europe and the U.S., with P2 facilitating coordination. For example, the 1976 Letelier assassination involved DINA agents trained in CIA methods, mirroring Gladio’s covert tactics. Gladio’s arms caches inspired Condor’s use of hidden detention centers, like Argentina’s ESMA.

	5	Financial Networks:
	◦	P2’s financial pipelines, including Calvi’s [[Banco Ambrosiano]], supported both Gladio’s terrorist acts and Condor’s operations. The 1982 Banco Ambrosiano collapse revealed funds diverted to Argentine and Chilean juntas, linking Gladio’s European subversion to Condor’s repression. Gelli’s 1974 meetings with U.S. officials, including Alexander Haig, secured CIA backing for both networks.

==Conclusion= 
The Gladio-Condor nexus amplified repression across continents, with P2 as a transatlantic conduit. Gladio’s exposure in 1990, following P2’s 1981 unmasking, and Condor’s revelation through declassified U.S. documents (1990s) and Paraguay’s 1992 Archives of Terror confirmed their interconnected roles. Trials convicted Condor figures like Contreras and Massera, but Gelli evaded full accountability. Declassifications, including Italy’s 2021 efforts, continue to clarify these ties.  The Gladio-Condor connection exemplifies Cold War covert operations prioritizing anti-communism over human rights. Their shared use of terrorism, intelligence collusion, and P2’s networks left a legacy of trauma in Italy and South America, fueling demands for justice and transparency into state-sponsored violence.